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ABSTRACT  
Enforcing intellectual property (IP) rights abroad is not easy – not least because international 
IP treaties do not create global rights that can invoked in national courts. International 
investment law offers potential routes for overcoming these hurdles. Whenever investment 
treaties include IP rights as an investment and allow for investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS), investors can challenge host state measures affecting their IP rights in ISDS 
proceedings.  As this article will show, this in turn offers a unique opportunity for invoking the 
standards of protection under international investment agreements (IIAs) to challenge host state 
compliance with international IP treaties.  
While challenging national IP regimes is an attractive option for right holders, these challenges 
potentially amount to a sea-change for the international IP regime and cause serious concern 
for host states. I however argue that most of the routes pursued by right holders under IIAs are 
unlikely to be successful. Investment protection standards such as fair and equitable treatment, 
umbrella clauses and most-favored nation treatment should not be construed to allow invoking 
alleged breaches of international IP norms in ISDS. Some IIAs however contain clauses that 
subject expropriation claims against compulsory licenses and other IP limitations to a test of 
consistency with the international IP rules governing these limitations. As they offer the only 
feasible route for investors to challenge host state compliance with international IP treaties, I 
review the implications of these clauses, recent reform proposals and suggest alternative 
mechanisms for aligning international IP and investment protection based on general 
international law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The protection of IP rights via international investment agreements (IIAs) has been the subject 
of considerable scholarly interest in recent years.1 Most IIAs cover IP rights as a form of 
investment and commonly allow investors to directly challenge host state measures in investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS).  As a result, several high-profile investment cases have arisen 
where right holders invoke protections under IIAs to challenge measures by host states that 
affect their IP rights in these states.  
The cases ultimately indicate a unique opportunity for plaintiffs to invoke protections granted 
under IIAs to challenge host state compliance with international IP treaties. Generally, private 
right holders have no standing in fora where states can adjudicate compliance with international 
IP norms (such as the WTO dispute settlement system). Furthermore, domestic courts seldom 
allow right holders to invoke international IP norms directly or even to challenge a domestic 
IP provision as inconsistent with the forum state’s international IP obligations, such as those 
under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).2 
In the high-profile cases discussed below, right holders have attempted to circumvent these 
restrictions by utilising protections under IIAs to allege various breaches of international IP 
treaties.  
Against this background, this Article reviews the various routes pursued by right holders to 
challenge host state compliance with its international IP treaty obligations in ISDS. My 
conclusion is that most challenges are unlikely to be successful. Investment protection 
standards such as fair and equitable treatment, umbrella clauses and most-favored nation 
treatment should not and have not been construed to allow invoking alleged breaches of 
international IP norms in ISDS. The article moves to examine specific clauses in some IIAs 
that ostensibly safeguard the most common forms of state interferences with IP rights (such as 
compulsory licenses and revocations) from expropriation challenges. It shows that by 
subjecting these interferences to a test of consistency with the relevant international IP 
                                                          
* King’s College, University of Cambridge and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich. 
An early version of this paper had been presented at the Society of International Economic Law biannual 
Conference in Berne, Switzerland and a revised version at a workshop on IP and investment law at King’s 
College, Cambridge. I thank the reviewers of my manuscript and all workshop participants for their comments. 
All errors remain mine. 
1 See for example Simon Klopschinski, Der Schutz geistigen Eigentums durch völkerrechtliche 
Investitionsschutzverträge (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2011); Bryan Mercurio, Awaking the Sleeping Giant: 
Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements, Journal of International Economic Law 
Vol.15 No.3, 871-915 (2012); Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell & James Munro, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in 
International Investment Agreements: Striving for Coherence in National and International Law’, International 
Economic Law after the Global Crises, edited by Chin Lim & Bryan Mercurio (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 384; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Investment Law and Intellectual Property Rights, in M Bungenberg, J 
Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, International Investment Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015), 1692-
1714 (with further references).  
2 For the approach in the EU see for example M Miller, TRIPS Agreement and Direct Effect in European 
Community Law: You Can Look...But Can You Touch, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1999), 597; for an Indian 
perspective see the decision of the Madras High Court, Judgment of August, 8 2007, Novartis AG v. Union of 
India. 
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standards, these ‘safeguard clauses’ offer the only feasible route for investors to challenge host 
state compliance with their international IP obligations. The article then in a third step assesses 
the implications of these clauses in light of Eli Lilly’s complaint against Canada and highlights 
the significant changes to the dynamics of the international IP system should right holders be 
successful and have national IP law reviewed for its compliance with TRIPS or other IP treaties. 
Because of these implications, the article looks at recent reform proposals for such clauses and 
proposes alternative mechanisms for aligning international IP and investment protection that 
are based on general international law. 
Following this introduction, Section II frames the nature of the problem by examining the cases 
where investors have invoked breaches of international IP norms in ISDS. It offers an overview 
on the arguments made by right holders to this effect and thereby indicates what routes, from 
amongst the standards of protection available under the relevant IIAs, have been employed to 
challenge host state compliance with IP treaties such as the WTO TRIPS Agreement, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (PC), the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
and Chapter 17 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It also considers the 
so far only decided case that is publicly available where an investor had invoked a breach of 
an international IP treaty, but eventually failed. Contrasting this decision from arguments made 
in the other cases, this Section concludes which routes for invoking international IP norms 
deserve further analysis. 
 
Section III then assesses in detail the four routes identified in Section II and explores the merits 
of arguments that right holders have made or are likely to make in order to challenge host state 
compliance with IP treaties. These four pathways under IIAs that demand further scrutiny are: 
(1) the notion of protecting legitimate expectations under fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
and expropriation standards; (2) umbrella clauses which extend protection to other 
commitments of the host state in relation to the investment; (3) the most favoured nation (MFN) 
principle where investors could claim protection under international IP treaties as a ‘more 
favourable treatment’ of their investments; (4) and finally clauses which aim to safeguard 
accepted limits to IP rights in international treaties against claims of expropriation (safeguard 
clauses). The analysis reveals a certain irony in that these clauses – by subjecting these limits 
to a test of consistency with the corresponding international IP standards – effectively offer the 
only promising route to ‘import’ international IP norms into ISDS proceedings. They hence are 
at the focus of this Article. 
 
Based on the conclusion that most of the routes examined generally do not allow foreign 
investors to successfully rely on international IP norms in investment disputes, Section III goes 
on to take a closer look at the law and policy implications of ‘safeguard clauses’ as the only 
promising route. These clauses raise a range of legal questions about their effects on 
determining the burden of proof for a breach of international IP norms, the appropriate 
interpretative context to assess such a breach and the scope of a consistency test when applied 
in ISDS. In practice, they also are likely to have profound policy implications for the ability of 
states to rely on the flexibilities within the international IP system – flexibilities that have been 
highlighted by many for their importance in pursuing domestic public policy goals such as 
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access to medicines and food.3 In light of these implications, Section III finally examines recent 
attempts to modify safeguard clauses in IIA negotiations. Section IV then concludes the Article 
by offering alternatives to integrate external norms based on general international law doctrines 
that allow a sufficient degree of ‘integration’ of international IP norms within the international 
investment protection – but without disrupting the carefully negotiated balance between 
international harmonization and domestic flexibility in the international IP system. 
 
 
II. CASES INVOKING BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL IP NORMS IN ISDS 
 
For long, the practical relevance of the IP and investment law overlap – caused by the 
incorporation of IP rights as a form of investment that is covered by most IIAs4 – seemed 
negligible. In recent years however, several high-profile cases have emerged where right 
holders rely on international investment protection to challenge various host state measures 
affecting IP rights. In the three most contested and publicly visible disputes, the measures 
challenged implement, directly or indirectly, important policy choices of the host state to 
protect public interests such as reducing tobacco consumption (by limiting the way logos and 
brand names can appear on packaging) or promoting access to medicines (by applying strict 
patentability requirements that often affect pharmaceutical products). This section offers an 
overview how, in all of these cases, international investment protections are invoked to 
challenge these measures as in breach of international IP treaties. This reveals a trend whose 
implications are further reviewed in the following Sections. This Section however also looks 
at the so far only ISDS Award where a decision has been reached on claims of a breach of an 
international IP treaty: In AHS vs Niger, this claim has been rejected. It is therefore useful to 
contrast the arguments for rejecting this claim with the arguments raised in the three ongoing 
cases. On this basis, this Section concludes which kind of routes for invoking breaches of 
international IP treaties deserve further scrutiny in Section III. 
  
 
1. Plain Packaging Challenges in Philip Morris vs Uruguay and Philip Morris Asia vs 
Australia 
  
Two of the pivotal cases involve the tobacco company Philip Morris and its on-going battle 
against various attempts to limit the use of attractive logos, brands and other get-up on tobacco 
                                                          
3 See the WTO Ministerial Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) 
(Doha, 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2); and for the UN, for example UN Economic and Social 
Council, ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human 
Rights – Report of the High Commissioner’, (27 June 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13), as well as United Nations 
– Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (31 March 2009, A/HRC/11/12) paras.68-93, 108.  
4 For a comprehensive study on how BITs cover IP rights as protected investment see Rachel Lavery, ‘Coverage 
of Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of Definitions in 
a Sample of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements’ 6(2) (2009) Transnational Dispute 
Management, pp.4-7 and Annex 1. Lavery observes that although few BITs do not explicitly address IP rights, 
this does not necessarily mean that they do not cover IP since BITs generally provide that the lists of covered 
investments are not exhaustive. 
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packaging.  In 2010, three Philip Morris (PM) companies filed a request for arbitration under 
the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Uruguay and Switzerland with the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),5 alleging that Uruguay’s limits on 
the use of trademarks on tobacco packaging ‘have substantially damaged the value of the 
companies’ investments in Uruguay and deprived them of the ability to use their brands and 
trademarks’.6 Despite the lack of publicly available filings by the parties, reports indicate that 
the tobacco company charges a breach of the FET standard by asserting its legitimate 
expectation that Uruguay complies with the TRIPS Agreement.7 Since Uruguay’s limitations 
on the use of trademarks on tobacco packages violate the TRIPS Agreement, the argument 
goes, this violation frustrates PM’s expectation that Uruguay would comply with TRIPS and 
hence amounts to a breach of FET. In essence, PM uses the ISDS vehicle to litigate compliance 
with international IP provisions. After a July 2013 decision on jurisdiction where Uruguay’s 
objections had been rejected,8 the case is proceeding on the merits. 
 
Meanwhile, in 2011, Australia introduced its Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill. The bill had two 
relevant provisions: First, it requires tobacco product packaging to be in drab dark brown or 
other prescribed colour; and second, it prohibits the use of graphic trademarks and restricts the 
use of word marks on tobacco product packaging to the effect that the brand, business, company 
or variant name may be displayed only in certain standard styles and positioning on the 
packaging.9 The idea behind these rules is to reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco 
products to consumers, increase the noticeability and effectiveness of mandated health 
warnings, and reduce the ability of the tobacco product and its packaging to mislead consumers 
about the harms of smoking. 
 
In response, Philip Morris Asia (PMA), based in Hong Kong, initiated ISDS proceedings 
against the Australian Government under the Hong-Kong-Australia BIT.  PMA argues that 
plain packaging turns tobacco products into a commodity, prevents it from distinguishing its 
products from competitor brands, and thereby substantially diminishes the value of PMA’s 
investments in Australia. One of its key claims is that Australia is in breach of the BIT because 
plain packaging is inconsistent with international trademark rules in the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property (PC) and the TRIPS Agreement. Relying primarily on the 
                                                          
5 Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. 
(Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, [2009], ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Philip Morris v Uruguay). 
6 The two regulations challenged by PM concern an increase in the packaging space reserved for health warnings 
from 50 to 80% and a ‘single representation requirement’ that prohibits sales of more than one variation of 
cigarettes under a single brand name (as a response to so-called colour-coding where a particular variation of a 
brand suggests a ‘light’ product, etc). See Philip Morris International, Statement and background information 
regarding the company's Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) claim against the government of Uruguay, 5 Oct 2010, 
available: http://www.pmi.com/eng/media_center/company_statements/pages/uruguay_bit_claim.aspx. 
7 See Todd Weiler, Philip Morris vs. Uruguay: An Analysis of Tobacco Control Measures in the Context of 
International Investment Law, 28 July 2010, at 26-27. 
8 The tribunal rejected, inter alia, the argument that Philip Morris’ business of selling tobacco products in 
Uruguay is not an ‘investment’ entitled to arbitration under Art.25 of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal 
argued that for an investment to contribute to the host state’s economic development (as any of the other ‘Salini 
criteria’) is not a ‘mandatory legal requirement’, but merely pointing to the typical features of an investment. 
See Philip Morris v Uruguay, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 July 2013, para.204-210. 
9 Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011, s 19, 20, 21, 36. 
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FET standard, PMA claims a ‘legitimate expectation that Australia would comply with its 
international trade treaty obligations’, in particular under TRIPS and the PC.10 PMA has also 
argued that the umbrella clause in the Hong Kong-Australia BIT requires Australia to observe, 
as an obligation it has entered into with regard to investments of protected foreign investors, 
compliance with ‘international obligations binding on the host state that affect the way in which 
property is treated in Australia’.11 According to PMA, these obligations include those deriving 
from international IP treaties such as TRIPS and the PC. On 17 December 2015 however, the 
investment tribunal rejected its jurisdiction and dismissed PMA’s claims on procedural 
grounds.12  
 
While this effectively ends this ISDS complaint, it is nevertheless worth further exploring the 
arguments made to challenge compliance with international IP norms: Several countries around 
the globe, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, France, New Zealand and India have been 
considering to introduce plain packaging or similar measures. It is very likely that measures 
introduced elsewhere will face a similar challenge under an applicable IIA. In light of the 
arguments made by PM and PMA so far, it is equally likely that such a challenge will also be 
based on alleged breaches of international IP norms that tobacco companies will try to ‘import’ 
into ISDS via routes such as FET and umbrella clauses. 
 
Next to these routes that emerge directly from the arguments in the tobacco packaging disputes, 
there is another option: Although so far not invoked in publicly available documents, there is 
a possibility that a foreign investor might try to invoke a most-favoured nation (MFN) clause 
in an IIA to demand, from the host state, IP protection under TRIPS or other IP treaties as a 
form of ‘more favourable treatment’ for its investment: If the scope of a MFN rule is construed 
to cover the protection under an international IP treaty, an IP right holder might well attempt 
to rely on the IP standards set out in that treaty in ISDS proceedings. In the dispute against 
Uruguay, PM for example might try to argue that the Mercosur Protocol harmonising 
trademark protection establishes a right to use a trademark as a form of more favourable 
treatment for PM’s tobacco trademarks that Uruguay must extend to PM. While such a 
construction of MFN faces several hurdles – not least the fact that international IP treaties 
generally do not grant any directly enforceable rights – MFN clauses in IIAs may nevertheless 
provide yet another argumentative tool for investors to invoke international IP norms in ISDS. 
All these routes for challenging compliance with IP treaties demand further examination that 
will be undertaken in Section III. 
 
 
                                                          
10 Philip Morris Asia vs. Australia, Notice of Arbitration, 21 November 2011, at para.6.5 and 7.6-7.11. 
11 Ibid, at para.7.15-7.17; even prior to the decision on jurisdiction of 17 December 2015 mentioned in note 10, 
this claim apparently had been dropped by PMA – most likely for the reasons discussed in Part II 2). 
12 See Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, Breaking: Australia prevails in arbitration with Philip Morris over 
tobacco plain packaging dispute, Investment Arbitration reporter, 17 December 2015. At the time of writing, 
neither the decision, nor the principal arguments for rejecting PMA’s claims have been made public. It however 
appears likely that the claims have been rejected because of Australia’s argument that PMA has only obtained 
the relevant investments in Australia when it knew very well that plain packaging was coming. Essentially, 
Philip Morris had been ‘treaty shopping’ for an IIA that offered it investment protection. 
7 
 
2. Patent Revocation Challenge in Eli Lilly vs Canada 
 
A rather different investment dispute where again compliance with IP treaties is challenged 
concerns the US-based pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly and the revocation of two of its 
patents in Canada. In November 2012, Eli Lilly initiated ISDS proceedings under Chapter 11 
of NAFTA against Canada, following the invalidation of pharmaceutical patents for its drugs 
Strattera and Zyprexa by Canadian courts.13  
 
At the centre of the dispute is a ‘promise doctrine’ whereby Canadian courts take for granted 
what the patent application has described as the specific useful effect of the invention and 
require the applicant to show adequate support for that specific utility claimed in the 
application: If the applicant does not provide sufficient evidence, at the time of filing, for the 
promised utility the court has construed from the patent claims and description, the required 
disclosure is insufficient to support the ‘promise’ and the patent granted can be revoked.14 In 
order to justify a patent for a new use of a known substance and one for selecting a specific 
element from amongst a large group of known compounds, Eli Lilly had made specific utility 
claims in order to differentiate these applications from earlier patents – claims which Canadian 
Courts held to be insufficiently supported by evidence in the patent application.15 Lilly 
complains that the strict patentability standards resulting from the promise doctrine, as applied 
by the Canadian Courts since 2005, are violating Canada’s international IP obligations under 
NAFTA, TRIPS and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). This in turn, Lilly argues, breaches 
NAFTA’s investment chapter since ‘Canada has a positive obligation to ensure Canadian law 
complies with NAFTA and the PCT, consistent with the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of the investor.’16  
 
Similar to the plain packaging disputes, the investor relies on the FET (and in this instance also 
on the expropriation) standard to claim a legitimate expectation that the host state complies 
with international IP norms. In Eli Lilly vs Canada however, a specific NAFTA clause ensures 
that the expropriation standard does not apply to certain IP limitations such as compulsory 
licenses or revocations of IP rights – as long as these limits are consistent with relevant 
international IP rules.17 This clause, which also occurs in a range of other IIAs, offers an 
additional explanation why Lilly puts so much emphasis on a breach of IP treaty norms: unless 
Lilly can make a case that Canada’s measures violate the relevant international IP provisions, 
it is effectively barred from invoking protection against expropriation for its patents. That in 
turn would significantly limit Lilly’s ability to rely on one of its strongest arguments – the 
                                                          
13 Eli Lilly and Company vs. Canada, Notice of Intent, 7 November 2012. The Lilly arbitration and the 
preceding domestic litigation in Canada is discussed in more depth in the contribution by Kathy Liddell & 
Michael Waibel in this Special Issue.  
14 For a detailed discussion of the promise doctrine see Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, ‘The Promise of the 
Patent in Canada and Around the World‘ 30(1) (2014) Canadian Intellectual Property Review 35, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2361146 
15 See Eli Lilly & Company v Teva Canada Limited, 2011 FCA 220, affirming the earlier trial court decision 
(2010 FC 915) and Eli Lilly Canada v Novopharm Limited, 2012 FCA 232, again affirming the earlier trial court 
decision (2011 FC 1288). I am thankful for the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 
16 Eli Lilly vs. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, para.71, 77. 
17 See Art.1110 (7) NAFTA, referring to the IP standards set out in Chapter 17 of NAFTA. 
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detrimental legal and economic effect the revocation has on its patents and their exploitation. 
In order to keep the door open for these expropriation arguments, Eli Lilly thus first has to 
show a breach of Canada’s IP obligations. Clauses such as Art.1110 (7) NAFTA hence serve 
as another ‘door opener’ to litigate compliance with international IP law in ISDS. As they 
ensure that expropriation protections do not undermine flexibilities on compulsory licenses and 
other limitations in the international IP order, I refer to them as safeguard clauses. 
 
The Eli Lilly patent revocation case shows that invoking international IP norms and challenging 
host state compliance in ISDS is not a phenomenon specific to tobacco packaging disputes. 
Since this line of argumentation appears in most of the publicly available IP-related investment 
disputes so far, it is not at all unlikely that similar claims will be made in future cases. Before 
the merits of these arguments are further scrutinised in Section III, the so far only decided case 
involving international IP norms that has been made public will be considered. Since the 
arbitrators refused to rule on the issue of compliance with an IP treaty in that case, it can be 
usefully compared with the arguments made in the disputes discussed so far. This allows to 
filter out those routes for challenging compliance that have already been rejected by an 
investment tribunal. 
 
 
3. Unauthorised Use of Trademarks in AHS vs Niger  
 
On 15 July 2013, ICSID released excerpts of an award in a case relating to the termination of 
an airport services concession in Niger in 2010. The dispute involved aviation handling service 
provider MMEA, a Luxembourg-registered company, and AHS, its Nigerien subsidiary, which 
jointly brought a claim against Niger in March 2011.18 Under the concession, the claimants had 
provided airport cargo and ground services at Niamey International Airport in Niger. When 
authorities terminated the concession and seized the claimants’ bank accounts and equipment, 
AHS and MMEA initiated arbitration proceedings under ICSID.19 In an award from July 2013, 
arbitrators considered the actions by Niger as expropriation and awarded 4.6 million Euros in 
compensation. 20 In the arbitration, AHS and MMEA also complained about infringements of 
its IP rights, in form of trademarks and trade names registered with OAPI, a regional IP 
Organization in Francophone Africa to which Niger is a Member. The complainants alleged 
that the new personnel employed by the Nigerien authorities, after seizing AHS’ equipment, 
had continued to operate airport services using uniforms with IP protected trademarks and trade 
names registered for the claimants until early 2011.21 
 
The arbitrators found the arguments of the complainants with regard to this use of IP protected 
subject matter as not sufficient to establish a right to compensation: One the one hand, AHS 
                                                          
18 See the report by Investment Arbitration Reporter, Niger liable for expropriation of airport services 
concession, but no damages due for subsequent Misuse of Intellectual Property, 19 December 2013, – online 
available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20131219/. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v. Republic of Niger (AHS vs Niger), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/11, Award of 15 July 2013. 
21 Ibid, at para.150. 
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and MMEA asserted that the use of their trademarks and trade names violated the Bangui 
Agreement,22 a regional IP treaty which establishes a system of trademark protection. 
Crucially, while the complainants could show that Niger has ratified the Bangui Agreement, 
they were unable to explain how compliance with this Agreement mattered for the dispute.23 
In particular, the arbitration tribunal found that AHS and MMEA had not explained how it 
would be competent to hear arguments about a breach of the Bangui Agreement. The tribunal 
noted Art.47 of Annexe III of the Bangui Agreement that allocates jurisdiction for civil actions 
related to trademarks to civil courts; and further identifies the competent national courts in case 
of criminal actions, including defences based on the invalidity of the trademark.24 
 
Apart from the alleged breach of the Bangui Agreement, the complainants argued that the use 
of their trade names and trademarks deceived the users of stop-over services by creating the 
impression that AHS was still responsible for low quality services performed by the stop-over 
assistance unit after seized by Niger.25 AHS and MMEA argued that this negatively affected 
their reputation in Niger, relying on a service-audit performed by the company DHL in relation 
to the stop-over assistance unit. The arbitrators nevertheless found that AHS and MMEA were 
unable to show any consumer confusion between the services of the stop-over assistance unit 
after being seized and the services earlier provided by AHS Niger – so that no harm to 
reputation had been proven.26 
 
This review of the IP aspects in AHS vs Niger reveals that the arbitrators rejected the 
complainants’ arguments based on breaches of international IP obligations (of Niger under the 
Bangui Agreement), and on infringements of the trademark rights owned by AHS and MMEA. 
While the latter is rejected on merit (there was apparently insufficient evidence for showing 
consumer confusion, generally an essential element of trademark infringement), the alleged 
breach of an international IP treaty was rejected on jurisdictional grounds: The complainants 
had simply not provided any relevant arguments why compliance with the Bangui Agreement 
could be subject to arbitration. This points to the key difference between this case and the other 
disputes described above: In Lilly vs Canada and in the tobacco packaging disputes, investors 
have relied on various arguments and investment standards that establish grounds for linking 
breaches of international IP rules with the protection of foreign investments. Essentially, an 
investment ‘hook’ – such as umbrella or safeguard clauses, FET or expropriation standards or 
MFN – is necessary to import international IP norms into ISDS so that compliance with them 
may be reviewed. General references to international law as (part of) the applicable law, such 
as in Art.42 ICSID, are insufficient for this purpose. 
 
 
4. Connecting the Cases: A Trend towards Challenging Compliance with IP Treaties via ISDS 
                                                          
22 Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization, Constituting a 
Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property, 
Bangui (Central African Republic), March 2, 1977. 
23 AHS vs Niger, at para.152. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, at para.153. 
26 Ibid, at para.154. 
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The cases reviewed in this section reveal that there is a general trend to invoke international IP 
norms in investment disputes that involve IP rights. Various routes have been employed to 
challenge compliance of the host state measure at stake with IP treaties. Although the total 
number of publicly available challenges is few, it seems quite likely that future cases involving 
IP rights will also involve challenges that are primarily based on breaches of international IP 
norms. This is compounded by the fact that there is – compared to the number of substantive 
protections in IIAs – a much greater number of specific international IP obligations that result 
from the core multilateral treaties with almost universal membership as well as from an ever-
increasing amount of IP provisions in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). 
Right holders will find it easy to allege a breach of such a provision – but in IP law, they lack 
a forum to litigate them. ISDS offers them a forum; and the broad and ambiguous protections 
in IIAs such as FET, MFN or umbrella clauses allow them to re-package an alleged violation 
of a specific IP norm as breach of an IIA protection. Taken together, this offers a truly unique 
and unprecedented opportunity for private right holders to challenge national IP laws in a way 
not seen before. For this reason, the four routes that emerge from the cases discussed require 
further scrutiny in Section III.  
 
 
III. ROUTES FOR CHALLENGING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL IP 
TREATIES IN ISDS 
 
This Section analyses in greater detail the four possible routes for invoking international IP 
norms in ISDS that transpire from the cases examined in Section II. These four routes are (1) 
claiming, under FET or expropriation standards, a legitimate expectation that the host state 
complies with its international IP treaty commitments; (2) relying on umbrella clauses which 
are argued to incorporate international IP rules as a commitment the host state has made vis-à-
vis the investment; (3) invoking the MFN principle to demand a ‘more favourable treatment’ 
for the investment that is argued to result from an international IP norm; and (4) utilising the 
consistency test in safeguard clauses to argue that a limitation covered by such a clause is not 
consistent with the international IP standards to which that clause refers. The core question is 
that this Section aims to answer is whether the invocation of international IP norms is likely to 
lead to a review, by an ISDS tribunal, of compliance of a host state measure with that state’s 
obligations under applicable IP treaties. 
 
 
1. A Legitimate Expectation that the Host State Complies with International IP Treaties? 
 
The perhaps most prominent route chosen by investors to challenge the compliance of host 
state measures that affect their IP rights as being in breach of international IP norms is to rely 
on the concept of legitimate expectations. This contested concept is usually tied to the FET 
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standard, but may also relate, in some IIAs, to the protection against expropriation.27 
Subsection a) begins with a detailed scrutiny of the arguments on legitimate expectations in 
compliance with IP treaties that are made by investors and states in the three cases introduced 
in Section 2. Subsection b) then examines the guidance from WTO law and the case-law of its 
Appellate Body on the extent to which legitimate expectations can be claimed to emanate from 
the TRIPS Agreement. Integrating the findings from WTO law, Subsection c) returns to an 
international investment law perspective and highlights the role of the host state’s domestic 
law as principal starting point for any legitimate expectations. This allows to develop several 
criteria that must be fulfilled in order for an investor to legitimately expect host state 
compliance with international IP norms. The section concludes that on the basis of these 
criteria, the outlook for Eli Lilly and Philip Morris to successfully invoke legitimate 
expectations in the compliance with IP treaties such as TRIPS, the PCT or NAFTA Chapter 17 
appears rather bleak. 
 
 
a) Reviewing the Arguments made by Investors and States  
 
In the three core IP-related investment disputes reviewed in Section II, right holders are 
invoking international IP obligations of the host state as a source of their legitimate 
expectations. They allege breaches of these obligations which then arguably frustrate their 
expectation that the host state complies with these obligations. That in turn, so they claim, 
amounts to a violation of the FET standard. At first sight, this line of reasoning appears to offer 
a convenient way for any foreign investor holding IP rights in a host state that is bound by IIA 
with FET protections to utilize ISDS in order to challenge compliance with any international 
IP norms the host state is bound to. It provides the argumentative space for PM, PMA and Eli 
Lilly to claim, in ISDS, that Uruguay’s and Australia’s tobacco packaging measures and 
Canada’s patent invalidation amount to various breaches of TRIPS, the Paris Convention, 
NAFTA and the PCT. Before the merits of this line of reasoning are scrutinized in Subsections 
b) and c), it is worth to explore the individual arguments made by the PM, PMA and Eli Lilly 
– as well as the rebuttals by the respective host states – in more detail. 
 
In its claims concerning tobacco packaging against Uruguay, PM maintains: 
‘[W]hile a host state has the sovereign right to change its regulatory framework, 
including for the purpose of pursuing public health policies, such changes must be fair 
and equitable in light of the investor’s legitimate expectations. By issuing Ordinance 
                                                          
27 On the role of legitimate expectations within the FET standard see generally M Jacob & S Schill, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: Content, Practice, Method, in M Bungenberg, J Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, International 
Investment Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015), 700-743. It is particularly contested whether the 
protection of legitimate expectations is amongst the elements that are associated with the so called ‘minimum 
standard of treatment’ which has been argued to form the minimum baseline of the FET standard; see Andrew 
Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer, 2009), at 235, 279. See 
generally Rudolf Dolzer & Christroph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008), 
p.133-147 and C McLachlan, L Shore & M Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration (OUP, 2007), 
para.7.101-129. In its Annex setting out three factors that guide the determination of what constitutes an 
(indirect) expropriation, the 2012 US Model includes interference with legitimate investor expectations as one 
element.  
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514 which contains both the single representation requirement and the demeaning 
pictograms, and Decree 287/009 setting out the excessive health warning requirement, 
the Respondent failed to maintain a stable and predictable regulatory framework 
consistent with Philip Morris’ legitimate expectations. (…) Ordinance 514 and Decree 
287/009 must also be considered unfair and inequitable because they are incompatible, 
inter alia, with Uruguay’s treaty obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) as well as the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property rights (the “Paris Convention”).’28 
In a similar fashion, PMA had claimed that Australia’s plain packaging legislation frustrates 
its legitimate expectations in the host state’s compliance ‘with international trade treaty 
obligations’ and explains in detail how plain packaging would violate TRIPS and the PC.29 
 
Finally, in its dispute against Canada, Eli Lilly argues:  
‘The Government of Canada has a positive obligation to ensure Canadian law complies 
with Canada's international treaty obligations, as well as the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the investor. Lilly could not reasonably have expected that 
Canada’s patent regime, on which its investment in the Strattera Patent was predicated, 
would develop in a manner that departs so markedly from Canada’s international 
obligations.’30  
In its Memorial, Lilly further specifies the expectations it based on Canada’s compliance with 
NAFTA’s IP chapter and with the PCT: No ‘reasonable investor’ could have expected that 
Canada would develop a utility doctrine inconsistent with Chapter 17 of NAFTA – ‘particularly 
when Canada had enacted implementing legislation that expressly required that all federal laws 
must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the treaty’ and since ‘its own Minister of 
Industry had acknowledged on the floor of Parliament that Canada’s “ability to change [its] 
patent law [was] defined by [the] obligations” in Chapter 17.’ Lilly views the promise doctrine 
as a ‘dramatic and internationally wrongful departure in Canada’s patent law’ that is ‘plainly 
outside the acceptable margin of change that investors must reasonably anticipate’.31 
 
In the case of patent for the drug Strattera, Lilly further argues that it ‘expected that its PCT 
application, the basis for the Canadian patent filing, would be sufficient to meet Canadian 
requirements relating to disclosure of utility’ and that ‘Canada would not retroactively impose 
additional utility disclosure requirements to invalidate the Strattera Patent’. In order to 
substantiate the legitimacy of this expectation, Lilly simply points to Canada’s ratification of 
the PCT and to the relevant amendments to its Patent Act, claiming that Canada had issued 
regulations making clear that it would ‘adhere to the PCT in its entirety’.32  
 
This line of reasoning raises a key question at the interface between international IP and 
investment law: Can an investor legitimately expect that the host state complies with its 
                                                          
28 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, Request for Arbitration, 19. Februar 2010, para.84, 85 (emphasis added). 
29 Philip Morris Asia vs. Australia, Notice of Arbitration, 21 November 2011, at para.6.5-6.11 and 7.6-7.11. 
30 Eli Lilly vs Canada, Notice of Intent, at para.95-96. 
31 Eli Lilly vs Canada, Claimant’s Memorial, 29 September 2014, para.279. 
32 Ibid, at para.280. 
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international IP obligations? Effectively, this would turn treaty obligations owed to other states 
(with, if at all, an option for contracting states to enforce them) into a basis for investor 
expectations that in turn can be invoked in disputes against the host state. Without any explicit 
reference to such treaty obligations in an IIA, it appears difficult to assume that the IIA parties 
intended the FET standard to be construed in such a wide-ranging manner. Accordingly, 
Australia counters that claims of compliance with other treaty obligations ‘are plainly outside 
the scope of protection of the BIT, whether as a matter of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard established under Article 2(2) or the “umbrella clause” in Article 2(2)’.33  
 
In the specific NAFTA context, Canada further points to the 2001 NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission (FTC) Note of Interpretation, clarifying that a breach of another NAFTA 
provision or of a separate treaty does not equate to a breach of the minimum standard of 
treatment under Art.1105:1.34 Hence, potential violations of NAFTA’s IP chapter or the PCT 
as such cannot be actionable under NAFTA’s version of the FET standard. Regarding alleged 
breaches of the PCT, the fact that this is ‘strictly a procedural treaty which expressly provides 
that it does not prescribe substantive patent law obligations’ offers another reason why the PCT 
cannot serve as basis for any sort of legitimate expectation regarding substantive patentability 
requirements such as utility or sufficiency of disclosure.35 Finally, Canada emphasises the need 
to protect the ability of domestic courts in developing national (IP) laws: judicial law-making 
by means of evolutionary interpretation cannot, in the absence of a denial of justice, be 
challenged as an interference with legitimate expectations.36 
 
On balance, these counter-arguments offered by Canada and Australia raise serious questions 
about the merits of the reasoning employed by Philip Morris and Eli Lilly. In order to address 
these in a comprehensive manner that is grounded in international investment law, but also 
takes international IP law (in particular as incorporated into the WTO legal system) into 
account, the next Section adds the TRIPS’ perspective on legitimate expectations. With the IP 
view in mind, Subsection c) then completes the analysis based on international investment law. 
 
 
b) The Scope of Legitimate Expectations under TRIPS 
 
While relying on legitimate expectations in ISDS will of course be primarily judged against 
whether protection standards in IIAs allow to invoke such expectations at all, the set of rules 
on which the investor wishes to base its expectations cannot be irrelevant. In IP-related cases 
where the investor claims legitimate expectations based on international IP norms, the question 
whether these norms at all offer a basis for such expectations arises. With regard to the idea of 
                                                          
33 See PMA vs. Australia, Australia’s response to the Notice of Arbitration, 21 December 2011. 
34 Eli Lilly vs Canada, Counter-Memorial of Canada, 27 January 2015, para.295 – referring to the FTC Notes of 
Interpretation, s. 2(3) (July 31, 2001). 
35 Ibid, at para.297 – pointing  to Art.27:5 PCT that states: ‘Nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations is 
intended to be construed as prescribing anything that would limit the freedom of each Contracting State to 
prescribe such substantive conditions of patentability as it desires (…)’. 
36 Ibid, para. 284-289, 295. 
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legitimate expectations based on TRIPS provisions in particular, the WTO Appellate Body 
(AB) has provided useful guidance that on this matter. 
 
In India – Patents, the AB explicitly rejected the approach of the Panel to rely on the concept 
legitimate or reasonable expectations that may result from TRIPS provisions as a guide to the 
interpretation of these provisions.37 The AB noted that in WTO law, this concept originated 
from non-violation complaints under Art.XXIII:1(b) GATT 1947, aiming to protect the 
benefits that could be legitimately expected from reciprocal tariff concessions against being 
negated by non-tariff barriers to trade.38 Since non-violation complaints did not (and still do 
not) apply to TRIPS by virtue of an (extended) moratorium under Art.64 TRIPS, the concept 
of legitimate expectations cannot guide the interpretation of TRIPS.39  
 
The AB then addressed the Panel’s further argument that this concept follows also from 
applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation, in particular the notion of good faith in 
Art.31 (1) VCLT. In rather blunt terms, the AB rejected this argument: 
‘The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  The Panel misunderstands 
the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.  The legitimate expectations of the parties to a 
treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself.  The duty of a treaty interpreter is 
to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties.  This should 
be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention.  But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone 
the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of 
concepts that were not intended.’40 
 
Although the arguments above refer to the expectations of WTO Members vis-à-vis TRIPS and 
whether such expectations guide the interpretation of TRIPS in WTO dispute settlement, they 
do have relevance for investor’s claims in ISDS. The AB plainly rejects the idea that legitimate 
expectations follow from or guide the interpretation of TRIPS – unless such expectations ‘are 
reflected in the language of the treaty itself’. If not even WTO Members as principal addressees 
can generally derive legitimate expectations from TRIPS rules, how should this be possible for 
private parties which are at best indirect beneficiaries of IP protection under TRIPS?  
 
On the other hand, in international investment law, the FET standard itself is the vehicle that 
introduces the (contested) concept of legitimate expectations. Once an ISDS tribunal accepts this 
concept as part of the applicable law, TRIPS (or any other international IP norm) could be seen 
as merely the object, but not the source of legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, claiming 
legitimate expectations in compliance with TRIPS essentially serves the principal purpose to 
litigate alleged breaches of TRIPS in ISDS. Accepting such claims effectively provides the 
                                                          
37 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India – Patents), 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS50/AB/R (19 December 1997), para.33-42. 
38 Ibid, at para.41. 
39 Ibid, at para.42. 
40 Ibid, at para.45 (emphasis in the original). 
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investor with a forum where his claimed expectation of what TRIPS obliges the host state to do 
is reviewed. In its result, this is not different from accepting legitimate expectations based on 
TRIPS provisions – something which the AB explicitly rejects. 
 
These considerations militate against considering investor expectations in host state 
compliance with TRIPS obligations as legitimate. Even a more limited argument that the 
interpretation of the FET standard under Art.31 (3) c) VCLT must be guided by TRIPS as a set 
of rules applicable between the IIA parties41 does not provide strong support for TRIPS 
obligations as basis for investor expectations: Such an argument must be aligned with the 
exclusive jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement in deciding over breaches of WTO law.42 
Arguably, Art.23 DSU equally forms part of the interpretative context under Art.31 (3) c) 
VCLT.43  The notion of systemic integration hence does not support claims that an investor can 
legitimately expect compliance with WTO law, including TRIPS. As TRIPS itself cannot be 
construed to convey legitimate expectations beyond those which are ‘reflected in the language 
of the treaty itself’44, there is no general support for deriving such expectations from TRIPS (or 
the other international IP treaties that are integrated into TRIPS by reference). Whether those 
international IP norms that are at stake in the disputes reviewed here actually do convey any 
legitimate expectations to private parties that then could be invoked via FET, will be examined 
in more detail in the next Section. 
 
On a systemic level, these considerations indicate the complex interplay between international 
investment and international IP law – and the distinct mechanisms for adjudication these systems 
employ. They also point to possibly different outcomes, depending on whose perspective is 
taken. In the words of the Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on Fragmentation: 
‘Answers to the question depend on who you ask, what rule system is your focus on.45 In line 
with the overall focus of this article, the following Section undertakes a closer scrutiny from the 
perspective of international investment law and FET-based options for litigating compliance with 
international IP norms. In order to paint a more holistic picture, it however integrates the views 
from the international IP system that follow from this Section. 
 
 
c) The Role of the Host State’s Domestic Legal Environment 
 
In international investment law, the necessary starting point for any legitimate expectations of 
the investor forms the domestic law and business environment of the host state.46 This is 
                                                          
41 See Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek 
Relief for Breaches of WTO Law, 6(2) (2003) Journal of International Economic Law, 493, at 503-506. 
42 Art.23 (1) DSU states: “When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or 
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.” 
43 Klopschinski, note 1, at 368-369.  
44 India – Patents, note 43, at para.45. 
45 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law (U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April  2006 , at 245. 
46 See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, note 29, para.7.105-107; Newcombe & Paradell, note 29, at 286. 
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particularly true for IP rights which, even in an age of significant international harmonization, 
remain in principle territorial grants based on national laws.47 International law does not create 
property rights autonomous from the domestic legal order – regardless how detailed and 
specific treaty rules on IP protected subject matter, the scope of IP protection or the exclusive 
rights to be granted to the right holder are.48 Furthermore, a majority of countries do not give 
direct effect to provisions of TRIPS, the Paris- or Berne Convention – but rather reserve for 
themselves the discretion for appropriately implementing them in their legal system.49 Even 
where the national constitutional set-up allows the direct application of international norms, 
only some IP treaty provisions, such as aspects of the priority rights under Art.4 of the Paris 
Convention, are sufficiently concrete and provide for executable rights for right holders.50 
Instead, most international IP norms – including those which are at the core of the allegations 
of treaty violations made by PMA and Lilly – are construed in a way that they can hardly be 
operationalised in a domestic law setting and invoked by an individual right holder. 
 
How, for example, should the NAFTA requirement for patents to be available for inventions 
that are ‘useful’ or ‘industrially applicable’ be given direct effect so that Eli Lilly can base any 
expectations on it? Without more, this provision says little, if anything, about the legality of a 
‘promise doctrine’. And how can the obligation in Art.20 TRIPS not to encumber the use of a 
trademark in a way that is ‘unjustifiable’ be directly applied to the limits imposed on PMA’s 
trademarks by Australia’s plain packaging? The concept of justifiability embodies policy space 
for normative considerations and domestic value judgements that are – within the limits of 
accepted principles of treaty interpretation – up to the implementing WTO Member to make.51 
These examples indicate that successfully invoking international IP norms in ISDS involves 
passing several hurdles. Only in exceptional situations where the domestic law (1) allows for 
the direct effect of an international IP rule (2) providing individual rights that can be executed 
without the need for concrete domestic implementation, right holders may, in principle, rely on 
an international IP rule. 
 
If these conditions are cumulatively fulfilled, an investor who benefits from such a rule may 
be able to claim a legitimate expectation that the host state complies with it. In light of the 
flexibilities and policy space international IP treaties often allow for contracting states in their 
domestic implementation, the notion of ‘compliance’ however may leave quite some discretion 
                                                          
47 Exceptions are unitary rights created on a regional basis, such as the Community Trademark, Design or Plant 
Variety rights in the EU. 
48 See for example the approach taken by the ECHR in relation to the right to property applied to IP rights in 
Anheuser Busch Inc. vs. Portugal, Judgement of the Grand Chamber, 11 January 2007 (Application No 
73049/01); generally see Monique Sasson, Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled 
Relationship between International and Municipal Law, Kluwer Law International (2010), at 66 and for IP rights 
in particular, Grosse Ruse – Khan, note 1, at 1695-1699. 
49 Next to the references in note 3 see generally Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Is There a Case – Legally and Politically – 
for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations? EJIL, Vol.25 No.1 (2014), 151-173. 
50 See the discussion in G H C Bodenhausen, The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(1968), at 10-16.  
51 See Justin Malbon, Charles Lawson & Mark Davison, The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights – A Commentary (EE 2014), 319-321; C Correa, Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (OUP 2007), at 200. 
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to the host state. Domestic implementation usually will be context-specific so that the 
international norm as such merely offers a loose framework within which the investor may 
expect a country to act. In China – IPRs for example, the Panel held that whether certain IP 
infringements occur on a ‘commercial scale’ (so as to trigger the obligation in Art.61 TRIPS 
to provide for criminal law sanctions) depends on the ‘extent of typical or usual commercial 
activity with respect to a given product in a given market’.52 The US lost its complaint about a 
breach of Art.61 as it did not offer sufficient evidence that for a specific product on the Chinese 
market, China had failed to criminalise IP infringing activities that were on a commercial scale. 
A flexible reading of international IP norms where states are allowed to choose from the range 
of possible interpretations and implement those which suit the domestic socio-economic 
environment thereby places further emphasis on the domestic implementation as basis for any 
investor expectations. 
 
Subjecting legitimate expectations to the wider socio-economic and legal context of the host 
state53 – here primarily in form of the domestic IP law, as interpreted and applied by its courts 
– has yet another implication. Based on the host state’s right to regulate,54 an investor will have 
to reckon with statute-based limits to IP rights as well as court doctrines that develop such 
limitations and adapt them to changing environments. In Saluka vs. Czech Republic, the 
tribunal emphasized:  
‘No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration 
of the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s 
legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be 
taken into consideration as well.’ 55 
In essence, even where legitimate expectations on the side of the investor exist, they are not 
protected per se – but need to be balanced against the host state’s legitimate regulatory interests 
which in turn must be appreciated ‘in the light of the high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters 
within their own borders.’56 Any expectations based on international IP rules thus need to be 
balanced with the host state’s right to regulate. Especially in today’s environment where IP 
protected subject matter and the way we use it is subject to constant change, this right demands 
sufficient discretion to respond to such changes.  
 
In sum, only where an international IP norm is a concrete embodiment of a directly applicable 
right for a foreign right holder in the host state, this norm serves as basic framework for legal 
protection of investor expectations. It is only then that, in the words of the WTO Appellate 
Body, legitimate expectations are ‘reflected in the language of the treaty itself’57. In these cases, 
a valid expectation is further subject to the host states policy space in implementing the norm. 
                                                          
52 China – Intellectual Property Rights (China – IPRs), Panel Report, WT/DS362/R (26 January 2009), at 7.577. 
53 See the discussion in Jacob & Schill, note 29, at 726-727. 
54 On balancing legitimate expectations with the right to regulate see ibid, at 728. 
55 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) vs Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, at para. 305. 
56 SD Myers Inc vs Canada, Partial Award 13 November 2000, para. 263. 
57 India – Patents, note 43, at para.45. 
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Such expectations finally have to be balanced against the right to regulate, as expressed in the 
IP context in various internationally accepted ways to limit the exclusivity an IP right entails. 
 
In lights of these limits on the extent to which IP rights and their international regulation 
provide for legitimate investor expectations, it appears rather unlikely that either Philip Morris 
or Eli Lilly can claim that the tobacco packaging measures or the patent revocation decisions 
interfere with legitimate expectations based on the domestic or international IP system. Even 
if Australian, Uruguayan or Canadian Law would allow the direct applicability of TRIPS, PCT 
or NAFTA IP rules, none of the core provisions at stake is sufficiently concrete to convey any 
specific expectation an IP right holder could rely upon: Art.20 TRIPS requires that restrictions 
on the use of trademarks shall not be ‘unjustifiable’ – while Art.1709:1 NAFTA demands to 
make patents available for inventions which, inter alia, are ‘capable of industrial application’. 
Both are written in general, open terms which allow flexibility and require fine-tuning in their 
domestic implementation. Neither of them in itself hence provides for individual rights an 
investor could expect the host state to comply with. And even if they would, successfully 
invoking them would need to be balanced against the right to regulate and to adapt domestic 
IP laws to a changing environment.  
 
The number of cases where an investor can successfully invoke international IP norms under 
the FET standard in front of an investment tribunal hence appears rather limited. In addition, 
the wider interpretative context of the applicable IIA is decisive – especially in the case of 
NAFTA: In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al vs the United States of America, 
the tribunal concluded that the FET standard in NAFTA, as informed by customary 
international law, ‘does not incorporate other legal protections that may be provided to 
investors or classes of investors under other sources of law’ – otherwise FET would become ‘a 
vehicle for generally litigating claims based on alleged infractions of domestic and 
international law’.58 This is indeed what Eli Lilly is looking for in its reliance on alleged 
breaches of international IP norms. And it is not least for this reason that the FET standard in 
general will not operate in a way that allows an IP right holder as investor to claim a legitimate 
expectation in the host state’s compliance with international IP norms.  
 
With regard to the most prominent route for an investor to challenge compliance with the host 
state’s international IP obligations in ISDS, the analysis in this Section allows the conclusion 
that this route does not appear to be a promising one. Taking into account the territorial nature 
of IP rights, the way their protection is regulated via international IP treaties, and how the 
concept of legitimate expectations in international investment law operates, right holders will 
find it very difficult to convince an ISDS tribunal to review compliance with an international 
IP treaty. 
 
 
2. Umbrella Clauses to Import International IP Norms? 
                                                          
58 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al vs the United States of America (Grand River vs US), Award, 
12 January 2011, para.219. 
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Another option for challenging compliance with international IP norms in ISDS can arise under 
so called umbrella clauses which primarily function to import obligations of the host state vis-
à-vis the investor and/or the protected investment from other legal sources (such as contracts 
with the investor) into an IIA.59 They enable the investor to claim breaches of the incorporated 
obligations in ISDS. Based on examples from the cases discussed in Section II, this section 
analyses whether umbrella clauses could be employed to import international IP norms in such 
a way that host state compliance with these norms would be reviewed by an ISDS tribunal. 
 
At least in one instance, an investor has relied on such a clause to claim breaches of 
international IP obligations. The applicable rule in PMA vs Australia, Art.2:2 HK-AUS BIT, 
provides that each contracting party must ‘observe any obligation it may have entered into with 
regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party’. PMA initially argued that 
Australia violated the umbrella clause because plain packaging is inconsistent with its 
obligations under TRIPS and the Paris Convention. In its Notice of Arbitration of 21 November 
2011, PMA claimed that  
‘[t]his obligation is broader than specific obligations or representations made by the 
host state to investors from the other Contracting State. It also encompasses other 
international obligations binding on the host State that affect the way in which property 
is treated in Australia, regardless of the nationality of the owners of that property.’60 
PMA considered the obligations enshrined in TRIPS and the Paris Convention as falling in that 
category and argued that as an owner of the affected investments, it ‘is entitled to expect 
Australia to comply with its obligations’.61 
 
Australia’s response is indicative of the issues raised when extending these clauses to 
obligations owed under international treaties between states: 
‘Even if it were correct (which it is not) that Article 2(2) could somehow be understood 
as extending an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to obligations owed by Australia to other 
States under various multilateral treaties, the treaties that PM Asia seeks to invoke all 
contain their own dispute settlement mechanisms. It is not the function of a dispute 
settlement provision such as that contained at Article 10 of the BIT to establish a roving 
jurisdiction that would enable a BIT tribunal to make a broad series of determinations 
that would potentially conflict with the determinations of the agreed dispute settlement 
bodies under the nominated multilateral treaties. This is all the more so in circumstances 
where such bodies enjoy exclusive jurisdiction.’62 
These jurisdictional limitations – expressed for example in Art.23 DSU – also affect the 
interpretation of the umbrella clauses in IIAs between parties both bound the relevant 
                                                          
59 See generally Newcombe & Paradell, note 29, at 437-479 and Anthony Sinclair, Umbrella Clauses, in M 
Bungenberg, J Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, International Investment Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 
2015), 887-958. 
60 PMA vs Australia, Notice of Arbitration, 21 November 2011, at para.7.16. 
61 Ibid, at para.7.17. 
62 See PMA vs. Australia, Australia’s response to the Notice of Arbitration, 21 December 2011. 
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multilateral treaties.63 A systemic interpretation of an umbrella clause as in Art.2:2 HK-AUS 
BIT does not allow such clauses to challenge compliance with IP treaties that have their own 
dispute settlement system – i.e. the TRIPS Agreement and the BC and PC obligation it 
incorporates. 
 
However, also for those IP treaties – such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty – which do not have 
their own dispute settlement system, reliance on umbrella clauses to challenge host state 
compliance in ISDS is unlikely to be successful: After an extensive review of the historical 
origins and the existing tribunal practice, the tribunal in Eureko vs Poland concludes with 
regard to an umbrella clause identical to the language in Art.2:2 HK-AUS BIT: 
‘The plain meaning – the ordinary meaning – of a provision prescribing that a state 
“shall observe any obligations it may have entered into” with regard to certain foreign 
investments is not obscure. The phrase “shall observe” is imperative and categorical. 
“Any” obligations is capacious; it means not only obligations of a certain type, but 
“any” – that is to say, all – obligations entered into with regard to investments of 
investors of the other contracting Party.’64 
On its face, the term ‘any obligation’ might seem broad enough to encompass international 
obligations of the host state.65 However, the extensive review of the tribunal focusses solely on 
the question whether umbrella clauses can import investment-related obligations derived from 
contracts with the investor or the domestic law of the host state.66 Nothing from the concept’s 
history or tribunal practice reviewed in Eureka vs Poland suggests that international obligations 
the host state owes to other states are equally covered. Recent commentary on the scope of 
umbrella clauses leads to the same conclusion.67 And even those which discuss the possibility 
of using umbrella clauses to litigate obligations under WTO law cannot point to a single 
decision where an investment tribunal has held a broad umbrella clause to cover obligations 
resulting from international agreements the host state has entered into vis-à-vis other states.68  
 
Instead, the umbrella clause at stake in PMA vs Australia explicitly qualifies ‘any obligation’ 
as those ‘entered into with regard to investments of investors’. It appears farfetched that BIT 
Contracting Parties intended this to mean each and every obligation that somehow affects 
foreign investment and how it fares in the host state. Given the number of binding international 
commitments states have entered into vis-à-vis another in areas such as trade and IP that have 
a bearing or indirect effect on foreign investments, such an understanding of umbrella clauses 
                                                          
63 Arguably, jurisdictional limits expressed for example in Art.23 DSU are ‘other relevant rules of international 
law applicable between the parties’ (of the IIA) that affect the interpretation of the umbrella clause – see section 
1. 2). 
64 Eureko v Poland, Partial Award (Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal, 19 August 2005), para. 246. 
65 Voon, Mitchell & Munro, note 1, at 404. 
66 Eureko v Poland (2005), para.244-260. 
67 Sinclair, note 66, at 940-947. 
68 As Alford observes, tribunals have interpreted broad umbrella clauses to give investors treaty rights with 
respect to contractual commitments and unilateral undertakings of the State embodied in municipal law – but 
none of the decided cases discussed by Alford concerns obligations emanating from an international agreement 
between sovereign states; see Roger Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment 
Arbitration, 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 35 (2014),  at 55-57 – online available at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol12/iss1/3. 
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would allow investors to invoke basically any provision of the WTO covered Agreements or 
other international IP and trade treaties. Indeed, a large part of international economic law – in 
particular IP protection under TRIPS – serves the wider aim of facilitating foreign direct 
investment and hence can impact on its treatment in the host state. That however does not mean 
that states intended all of these obligations to be enforceable by private parties in ISDS; and it 
also does not support an interpretation of umbrella clauses to this effect. A mere relevance of 
such an obligation for the protected investment hence does not turn this obligation into one 
‘entered into with regard to investments of investors’.69 Instead, this language suggests that the 
kind of obligations covered are only those where there is a specific and direct relation between 
the obligation of the host state and the investment of the investor: that is where the host state 
has ‘entered into’ the obligation with the objective to protect the specific investment the 
investor relies upon. 
 
Next to these hermeneutical arguments, the principle underlying umbrella clauses, the notion 
of pacta sunt servanda, implies that these clauses primarily aim to transform contractual rights 
of the investor into claims justiciable under an IIA.70 Since the host state does not owe 
obligations under an international treaty (such as TRIPS) to the investor, the pacta sunt 
servanda rationale does not apply. Therefore, one may conclude that unless the specific 
wording of the umbrella clause suggests otherwise, these clauses will not lend themselves for 
importing obligations the host state owes to other states under international treaties. Investors 
hence generally cannot rely on such clauses to claim a breach of international IP treaties in 
ISDS.  
 
This conclusion makes the outlook for Philip Morris in the remaining tobacco packaging 
disputes rather bleak: Neither the concept of legitimate expectations (via FET or expropriation 
claims), nor umbrella clauses allow investors to challenge compliance with international IP 
obligations of the host state.71 In trying to invoke breaches of international IP treaties, some 
investors (like Eli Lilly) can nevertheless try to rely on clauses such as those in Art.1110 (7) 
NAFTA – which at first sight rather appear to protect the host state so that IP related measures 
are safeguarded against expropriation challenges unless they breach international IP rules. As 
the next section discusses, there however is yet another route international investment law 
provides that investors might try to rely on in order to litigate compliance with international IP 
norms in ISDS.   
 
 
3. International IP Protections as More Favourable Treatment under Most-Favoured-Nation 
Rules?  
 
                                                          
69 See also Sinclair, note 66, at 946-947. 
70 Eureko v Poland, at 251. See also Newcombe & Paradell, note 29, at 438. 
71 Even before the tribunal rejected its jurisdiction, PMA appeared to have dropped its claim of international (IP) 
law violations under the umbrella clause – perhaps because their lawyers convinced PMA that it does not have a 
case. 
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Invoking the non-discrimination principle of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) in 
international investment law could offer an alternative route to challenge adherence to 
international IP protection standards in ISDS. This section scrutinises whether an investor can 
rely on a MFN rule in an IIA to demand protection under an international IP treaty as a form 
of more favourable treatment for his IP rights. Since the TRIPS Agreement already contains a 
broad MFN clause for right holders of WTO Members, the practically most relevant aspect of 
this question is not about expanding the scope of TRIPS MFN via MFN rules in an IIA.72 
Rather, it concerns the potential consequences that follow from the ability of an investor to 
directly invoke an IIA MFN rule in ISDS proceedings: It could enable an investor to challenge 
compliance of the host state with IP protection or enforcement obligations under TRIPS or 
TRIPS-plus FTAs by arguing that such protection must be made available to him as a more 
favourable treatment of his IP rights as investments. 
 
Akin to invoking legitimate expectations or umbrella clauses in ISDS to import international 
IP norms, the MFN standard as another form of IIA protection could serve as vehicle to 
challenge compliance with these norms in a way not possible under national or international IP 
systems. TRIPS of course does not allow private parties to rely on its MFN or national 
treatment clauses in WTO dispute settlement. Neither does the national law of most countries 
allow private parties to invoke these clauses directly in domestic proceedings. Do IIAs offer an 
alternative venue here? Could for example PM rely on the MFN principle in order to demand 
from Uruguay IP protection in accordance with Mercosur rules on trademarks as a more 
favourable treatment available to investors from other Mercosur countries? 
 
The answer has significant consequences for invoking IP obligations via ISDS: based on MFN, 
PM might attempt to claim that Art.11 of the Mercosur Protocol harmonising IP protection,73 
whereby ‘[t]he registration of a trademark shall grant the owner an exclusive right of use’, 
offers a more favourable treatment which Uruguay must provide for PM’s tobacco trademarks 
in Uruguay.74 Since MFN can be based on treatment owed to a third party by reason of a treaty 
obligation,75 it might not even be necessary that such protection is actually afforded to 
trademark owners from other Mercosur countries. Similarly, in the Australian plain packaging 
dispute, PMA may have tried to rely on the MFN rule in Art.3 of the HK-AUS BIT to challenge 
Australia’s compliance with Art.20 and other trademark protection obligations under TRIPS or 
TRIPS-plus FTAs (such as the US-Australia FTA) – by arguing that such protection must be 
made available as a more favourable treatment of its investments in form of trademarks.  
 
                                                          
72 Since the TRIPS national treatment and MFN obligations in Art.3 and 4 cover most aspects of the protection 
and enforcement of IP rights (see Art.1:2 and fn.3 to Art.3&4 TRIPS), the areas of IP protection which an IIA 
MFN rule could cover beyond TRIPS are likely to be very limited.  
73 Protocol on Harmonization of Intellectual Property Norms in MERCOSUR in the Field of Trademarks, 
Indications of Source & Appellations of Origin (Mercosur Decision No. 008 of 1995). 
74 Given the extremely contested nature of trademark rights in international law, this prima facie unequivocal 
statement in favour of a positive right to use a trademark (instead of a mere negative right to exclude) could, if 
invokable in ISDS, offer PM strong arguments against Uruguay’s measures limiting the use of a trademark on 
tobacco packaging. 
75 August Reinisch, Most Favoured Nation Treatment, in M Bungenberg, J Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, 
International Investment Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015), at 813-814. 
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In essence, also this approach might allow an investor to enforce host state compliance with all 
international IP obligations that a state has entered into vis-à-vis other states in front of an ISDS 
tribunal: As soon as the obligation to protect foreign IP holders in IP treaties is construed as a 
more favourable treatment for foreign investors, the IIA MFN rule may oblige the host state to 
extend this protection to IP rights held by the investor.76 This option is not only interesting 
because it allows for a review of the host state’s implementation of international IP treaties. It 
also may offer IP protection already prior to domestic implementation – by arguing that the 
relevant IP treaty (such as a FTA) directly provides for more favourable treatment to right 
holders from the contracting states. 
 
The principal objection to such an argument lies in the fact that international IP treaties 
essentially contain obligations for contracting states – but generally do not provide for directly 
enforceable direct rights for private parties.77 There hence is usually no protection that follows 
from an IP treaty which could be extended to a foreign investor under a MFN clause. Even 
assuming that an IP treaty could offer protection in form of sufficiently concrete and direct 
enforceable rights in exceptional circumstances, the scope of the MFN provision in an IIA will 
primarily depend on the precise wording of the relevant MFN rule. Before briefly turning to 
the plain packaging and patent revocation disputes, a few general remarks nevertheless are 
warranted: In international investment scholarship and practice, there is considerable debate 
about the scope of MFN rules in IIAs.78 Since the decision in Maffezini vs Spain where the 
tribunal held the applicable MFN clause to import the more favorable dispute settlement rules 
of another IIA,79 other tribunals have adopted a more narrow approach.80  
 
Voon, Mitchell & Munro argue that, based on the differences in the subject matter covered by 
IP treaties and IIAs, the ejusdem generis principle prevents an application of MFN clauses in 
IIAs to demand compliance with IP protection obligations in specific IP treaties.81 Indeed, Art.8 
of the ILC Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses confines MFN treatment to such 
treatment offered ‘to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship’.  Further, 
Art.9 limits the type of rights falling under a MFN clause to those covered by ‘the subject 
matter of the clause’; while Art.10 conditions the acquisition of a right to more favorable 
treatment to ‘treatment within the limits of the subject matter of the clause.’82 Even in 
Maffezini, the tribunal insisted that since an investor derives its rights solely from the basic 
treaty containing the MFN rule, ‘the third-party treaty has to relate to the same subject matter 
as the basic treaty, be it the protection of foreign investments or the promotion of trade’.83 
                                                          
76 See Voon, Mitchell & Munro, note 1, at 390-391.  
77 See Subsection 1 above. I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting the nature of IP treaty 
norms in this context. 
78 For a comprehensive discussion see Stephan Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Reinisch, note 84, at 807-845. 
79 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction) 
(ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/97/7, 25 January 2000). 
80 See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, note 29, para.7.165-7.169; Newcombe & Paradell, note 29, at 216-224.  
81 Voon, Mitchell & Munro, note 1, at 391-392. 
82 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on its Thirtieth Session, (1978) 2 YBILC 8 (pt. 2) (UN Doc A/33/10). 
83 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, at para.56. 
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These limitations based on the ejusdem generis principle function as a general guiding line to 
delineate the scope of IIA MFN clauses when applied to international IP obligations. While the 
protection offered by IIAs can cover IP rights held by a foreign investor, the subject matter of 
these treaties is the protection of foreign investments: IP rights can receive protection to the 
extent they meet the requirements of a protected investment under the relevant IIA. Protection 
then comes in form of the traditional relative and absolute standards of international investment 
law. IP treaties on the other hand focus on various types of creative or inventive expressions of 
the human mind, define under which conditions and how these creations or inventions are to 
be protected under domestic law and regulate some of the limits of protection. Hence they do 
not cover the same subject matter, although IP protection can overlap with investment 
protection. Both types of treaties define their protected subject matter differently and apply 
distinct requirements as to their scope. Assuming that those states which negotiated the IIA 
would have intended its MFN clause to function as a vehicle to import a whole set of treaty 
standards from a distinct area of international law seems, to put it mildly, farfetched. One can 
therefore conclude that unless the specific MFN clause in an IIA suggests otherwise, these 
clauses generally do not allow a foreign investor to rely on IP protection the host state is obliged 
to grant by virtue of an international IP treaty to right holders from the contracting states. 
 
This conclusion arguably would hold true in the plain packaging arbitration (should it have 
reached the merits phase): Under Art.3 of the HK-AUS BIT, Australia ‘shall in its area subject 
investments or returns of [PMA] to treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to 
investments or returns of investors of any other state”. While this clause generally refers to 
treatment accorded to investments – without the common qualification ‘in like circumstances’ 
(as for example under Art.1103:2 NAFTA) – this in itself is not sufficient for MFN to function 
as floodgate for any sort of protection Australia has committed to vis-à-vis other states under 
an international (IP) treaty. The same arguments that militate against a comparably expansive 
reading of umbrella clauses apply here as well: If Hong Kong and Australia had wished to grant 
its investors protection not only extending to that available for foreign investors under other 
IIAs, but reaching even further to all sorts of obligations owed to other states in distinct areas 
of international law, surely they would have made this explicit. As Australia contended in its 
reply to PMA’s Notice of Arbitration: ‘Such claims are plainly outside the scope of protection 
of the BIT’.84 Since most of the IP protection rules which could be invoked by PMA as more 
favourable treatment are further subject to the exclusive dispute settlement system of the WTO, 
an interpretation of the BIT’s MFN rule in light of Art.23 DSU as ‘relevant rule of international 
law’ under Art.31:3 c) VCLT also stands against a broad understanding.  
 
No different outcome would result from applying Art.1103 NAFTA in Eli Lilly’s patent 
revocation arbitration. This provision only requires MFN treatment for investors and 
investments of investors ‘in like circumstances’ and ‘with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.’ Apart from general ejusdem generis considerations about the NAFTA MFN 
                                                          
84 Australia’s Response to PMAs Notice of Arbitration, para.34. 
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provision not extending to international IP treaties, the ‘like circumstances’ qualification 
speaks against this. In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal explained the meaning of ‘like 
circumstances’ in Art.1103 as context dependent and varying according to the individual facts 
at hand.85 Quoting an UNCTAD Report, Gibson notes that among the essential matters to be 
considered are ‘whether the two enterprises are in the same sector; the impact of policy 
objectives of the host country in particular fields; and the motivation behind the measure 
involved.’86 Against this background, the protection for patent holders required under TRIPS 
or the PCT as such does not amount to ‘like circumstances’: TRIPS or the PCT rely, in the 
provisions relevant for Lilly, on factors that do not correspond with those decisive for the 
protection of its investments under NAFTA. The mere existence of an obligation to protect 
under TRIPS, the PCT or other international IP treaties does not amount to a more favourable 
standard, in like circumstances, for Lilly as investor or its investments. Most importantly, the 
fact that neither TRIPS, nor NAFTA Chapter 17, nor the PCT provide for direct rights for 
patent owners in Canada already prevents Lilly to successfully invoke the MFN standard in 
order to obtain protection under these IP treaties.  
 
In sum, MFN clauses in IIAs do not offer right holders a feasible opportunity to import 
international IP norms as a more favourable treatment and thereby effectively have 
implementation and compliance with these norms reviewed in ISDS. This however does not 
conclude the review of options a right holder could try. As the final Subsection 4. shows, a 
particular type of clauses that at first sight safeguard the most common forms to limit IP rights 
from expropriation challenges may in fact offer the only successful route to have compliance 
with international IP rules reviewed in ISDS proceedings. 
 
 
4. ‘Safeguard Clauses’ Exempting Measures Consistent with International IP Law from 
Expropriation Claims 
 
In relation to the protection against expropriation under international investment law, Section 
II has already introduced ‘safeguard clauses’ in IIAs which aim to ensure that this protection 
does not override limits to IP rights accepted in international treaties. For example, Art.1110:7 
NAFTA exempts essentially all IP related measures, including ‘the issuance of compulsory 
licenses’ and ‘the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights’ from 
expropriation claims – if such measures are consistent with NAFTA’s IP provisions. Similarly, 
Art.6 (5) of the 2012 US Model BIT provides that ‘the revocation, limitation, or creation of 
intellectual property rights’ does not amount to expropriation – as long as it is ‘consistent with 
the TRIPS Agreement’. In the 1990ies, the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
contained a comprehensive safeguard clause exempting IP-treaty consistent measures from 
expropriation claims.87 More recently, Art.9.7 (5) of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement 
                                                          
85 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL Award (10 April, 2001), at 75. 
86 Christopher Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International Investment Agreements 
Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights?, in Yearbook on International Investment Law & 
Policy (2010) 397, at 444. 
87 OECD, The MAI Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998), at 51. 
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(TPP) excludes from expropriation protection ‘the issuance of compulsory licences granted in 
relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement’, as well as 
‘the revocation, limitation or creation’ of IP rights as long as these acts are consistent with the 
IP Chapter in the TPP and with TRIPS. In the TPP, footnote 19 further explains that the term 
‘revocation’ of IP rights ‘includes the cancellation or nullification of those rights’; while the 
term ‘limitation’ of IP rights ‘includes exceptions to those rights’. 
 
This Section considers the legal and policy implications of such safeguard clauses with a 
specific emphasis on Art.1110 (7) NAFTA and its application in Eli Lilly vs Canada. It begins 
by assessing the legal implications of these clauses that effectively allow to review the 
consistency of a host state measure which falls within the scope of a safeguard clause against 
the relevant international IP norms referred to in that clause. This implicates the burden of 
proof for showing (in)consistency with the referenced international IP standards, the scope of 
the consistency test and the relevant interpretative context. This in turn has significant effects 
on the political economy of enforcing IP rights abroad – effects that have the potential to change 
the nature of international IP litigation. The section further looks at recent attempts to alleviate 
concerns resulting from the operation of safeguard clauses in Eli Lilly vs Canada.  
 
a) (Un)intended side effects 
 
At first sight, safeguard clauses appear as a reasonable mechanism to ensure coherence between 
international IP and investment treaties: As long as the arguably more specific body of 
international law considers a measure pertaining to its field as consistent with its (more 
specialised) rules, the more general standards of another area are not meant to interfere. 
However, these clauses effectively invite investors to challenge the required compliance of host 
state measures with TRIPS, NAFTA or other referenced IP treaties in ISDS. Lilly’s complaint 
about Canada breaching various provisions of NAFTA’s IP Chapter, based on the requirement 
for consistency with that Chapter in Art.1110 (7) NAFTA, confirm this.88 In its reply, Canada 
appears to accept this route for challenging consistency with international IP norms as it sets 
out, in almost 40 pages, to explain that its national patent law does conform with NAFTA’s IP 
Chapter.89 
 
This open invitation to challenge measures as inconsistent with TRIPS or NAFTA’s IP Chapter 
may well indicate that negotiators had intended the possibility of litigating TRIPS or NAFTA 
consistency.90 On the other hand, Canada’s arguments in the Lilly arbitration and recent 
modifications of these clauses in the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) in the wake of Lilly’s challenge to Canadian patent law suggest that 
certainly not all states envisioned these practical implications of safeguard clauses.91 Whether 
                                                          
88 Eli Lilly vs Canada, Claimant’s Reply Memorial, 11 September 2015, pp.124-153. 
89 Eli Lilly vs Canada, Canada’s Rejoinder Memorial, 8 December 2015, pp.58-94. 
90 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for making this point. 
91 See Eli Lilly vs Canada, Counter-Memorial of Canada, 27 January 201, para.345, where Canada explains the 
rationale of Art.1110:7 NAFTA as to prevent ‘the potential for abusive expropriation claims in the context of 
intellectual property’ – citing M Kinnear, A Bjorklund and J Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA: 
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intentional or unintentional, safeguard clauses like Art.6 (5) of the US Model BIT represent the 
only feasible route for investors to challenge a national measure as inconsistent with WTO IP 
rules. These clauses effectively allow the question of TRIPS consistency to be tested in 
proceedings outside the WTO dispute settlement system. In light of the exclusive jurisdiction 
under the WTO dispute settlement system, this raises questions about the legitimacy and 
acceptance of decisions on TRIPS compliance rendered by investment arbitration tribunals.92 
 
A first question is who will decide on TRIPS or NAFTA Chapter 17 consistency once this 
matter arises under a safeguard clause in ISDS proceedings? From the possible options of (1) 
deference to the host state, (2) a referral to WTO or FTA state-to-state dispute settlement, or 
(3) allowing the investment tribunal to decide this matter, the latter appears the most likely 
option in practice. As long as there is no clear basis for a tribunal to deny its jurisdiction to 
decide on a clause that is essential for determining the applicability of the expropriation 
standard, it seems highly unlikely that arbitrators would adopt any of the alternative approaches 
which are discussed, de lege ferenda, in more detail in Section III. Indeed, Canada does not 
even raise the idea that anyone but the investment tribunal established in the Eli Lilly case 
could or should decide on the issue of consistency with international IP norms.93 On a more 
careful reading however, Canada’s arguments suggest that national legislators enjoy wide 
discretion when implementing the broad and open terms used in Chapter 17 (such as ‘utility’ 
or ‘discrimination’).94 If the tribunal would accept this approach, it would – without denying 
its jurisdiction to decide on the consistency issue – de facto defer the decision to interpret and 
implement the relevant international IP norms to the host state. This option aligns with the 
further alternatives discussed in Section III. 
 
Considering that an investment tribunal is likely to take up the task of assessing the question 
of consistency with international IP norms, several further questions arise. An important 
practical matter concerns the burden of proof under safeguard clauses. In order to rely on a 
clause that leads to the inapplicability of the expropriation standards, the party invoking that 
clause needs to show that the compulsory license or other relevant IP limitation is indeed 
consistent with international IP law. Based on the general principle that the party invoking a 
rule of law has to show that its requirements are fulfilled, the host state as party relying on 
safeguard clauses will bear this burden of proof. This result – whereby the host state for 
example has to show consistency with TRIPS – however will often differ from allocating the 
                                                          
An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11 (Kluwer, 2006), at 1110-57, in support. For the CETA response to 
the Eli Lilly arbitration, see section b) below. 
92 See in particular the arguments made based on Art.23 DSU in sections 1, 2 & 3 and more generally the 
contribution by S Klopschinski in this Special Issue. While this exclusive jurisdiction clause does not bind private 
investors, any WTO Member agreeing to a BIT which allows ISDS to determine compliance of a host state 
measure with TRIPS may be acting in violation of Art.23:2 (a) DSU. 
93 Compare the Counter-Memorial of Canada, 27 January 2015, para.344-402, as well as the Canada’s Rejoinder 
Memorial, 8 December 2015, pp.58-94, where Canada explains in detail to the tribunal why its patent law is 
consistent with NAFTA Chapter 17 and the PCT without ever suggesting that this matter is beyond the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
94 See Canada’s Counter-Memorial, 27 January 2015, for example on the notion of ‘utility’ at para.351-352, 
355-357, 362-363, and especially 365-369. The flexibility inherent in these terms is explicitly claimed in 
Canada’s Rejoinder Memorial, 8 December 2015, at para.149. 
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burden of proof in the WTO dispute settlement system where this matter will depend on the 
individual complaints.95 In a WTO dispute over the consistency of a compulsory license, the 
complaining member state must show a breach of one (or more) obligations the responding 
state has for example under Art.27 (1) or 31 TRIPS.96 Under safeguard clauses in IIAs however, 
the host state will be responsible for showing that its compulsory license is ‘in accordance with 
the TRIPS Agreement’.97 
 
In Eli Lilly’s NAFTA Ch.11 challenge, reliance on Art.1110 (7) NAFTA requires Canada to 
show that its revocation of Lilly’s patents complies with Art.1709 (8) NAFTA which allows 
NAFTA parties to ‘revoke a patent only when:  
(a) grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent; or  
(b) the grant of a compulsory license has not remedied the lack of exploitation of the 
patent.’ 
Essentially, Canada has to show that Lilly’s patents did not meet the utility condition for patent 
protection under Art.1709 (1) NAFTA – or that the patents could have been refused on other 
grounds allowed in Art.1709 (1)-(3).98 This arguably differs from a proper allocation of the 
burden of proof in case the same issue arose in a state-to-state dispute under NAFTA Chapter 
20: Even if one understands Art.1709 (8) NAFTA akin to a defence where the defendant 
generally bears the burden of showing that its requirements are met, this should merely require 
Canada to put forward the ground that justifies a refusal to grant the patent (here: lack of utility) 
– while the complaining state then would have to show that the relevant condition for 
patentability (here: utility of Lilly’s patents) is in fact present.99 Art.1110 (7) NAFTA appears 
                                                          
95 See for example United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
Appellate Body Report (WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997), at 14: ‘the burden of proof rests 
upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence’. 
96 This follows from the general principle expressed in note 91: A WTO Member asserting that a compulsory 
license in the domestic law of another Member does not conform for example to the requirements of Art.31 TRIPS 
must prove that one or more of these requirements is not adhered to. The same would apply to alleged breaches 
of the non-discrimination rule in Art.27 (1) as well as other TRIPS obligations relating to the ability of a WTO 
Member to introduce limitations to the protection of IP rights. With regard to Art.30 TRIPS, the Panel in Canada 
– Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Patents), Panel Report (17 March 2000, 
WT/DS114/R) at 7.60, wrongly placed the burden of proving compliance the requirements Art.30 establishes for 
national exceptions to patent rights on the Defendant. Since however Art.30 (as well as other versions of the so-
called ‘three-step-test’) contain obligations imposed on Members for the design of their exception provisions in 
national law, Art.30 is not a defence the defendant has to invoke – but akin to a minimum standard whose breach 
the complainant has to establish; see Matthew Kennedy, ‘Blurred Lines: Reading TRIPS with GATT Glasses’ 
49(5) (2015) Journal of World Trade, 735, pp.745-47. 
97 See Art.6:5 of the 2012 US Model BIT and Art.9.7 (5) TPP. 
98 In its Counter-Memorial of 27 January 2015 (at para.346-402) and in its Rejoinder Memorial of 8 December 
2015 (at pp.58-94), Canada takes up this tasks and offers lengthy arguments to counter all the allegations of 
inconsistency with NAFTA’s IP Chapter that have been put forward by Lilly. While this not necessarily needs 
to be understood as accepting to bear the burden of proofing consistency with international IP norms, Canada 
clearly seems to feel obliged to show that revoking Lilly’s patent is consistent with NAFTA and the PCT – 
because only in that way it can demonstrate that the requirements of Art.1110 (7) NAFTA are met (see for 
example the Counter-Memorial, at para.346-352). 
99 Since proving a negative (i.e. that a particular invention is not useful) is generally fraught with difficulties, a 
sensible approach for both Chapter 11 and Chapter 20 disputes would be to require the respondent state to 
indicate the ground on which it wishes to base its decision to revoke a patent. In particular in cases where this is 
the absence of a general requirement for granting a patent, the complaining party then needs to show that the 
revocation cannot be justified on this ground – i.e. that the relevant requirement for granting the patent exists. 
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to turn this allocation of the burden of proof on its head. In sum, safeguard clauses require the 
host state to show consistency with international IP treaties – rather than the complainant to 
show a breach. 
 
Another issue relates to the scope of the consistency analysis under safeguard clauses: Does 
for example a TRIPS consistency test require an isolated analysis of the provision addressing 
the measure at stake – for example Art.30 TRIPS regarding exceptions to patent rights? Not 
construing Art.30 within the wider (interpretative) context of TRIPS would prevent the 
operation of one of the main flexibilities all WTO Members had agreed to under para.5 of the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: 
‘In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.’ 
Especially the open meaning of terms used in Art.30 TRIPS (such as unreasonableness, or 
legitimacy) can be significantly influenced by the balancing objective in Art.7 TRIPS and the 
public interests principle under Art.8 (1) TRIPS. Even in Lilly’s NAFTA challenge, Art.7 and 
8 TRIPS could be applied as ‘other relevant rules of international law applicable between the 
[NAFTA] parties’ to guide the understanding of NAFTA IP provisions.100 
 
However, the TRIPS objectives and the Doha Declaration as interpretative context are likely 
to feature less prominently (if at all) when a consistency analysis via a safeguard clause is 
warranted: While treaty interpretation by investment tribunals routinely relies on the principles 
embodied in Art.31-33 VCLT and hence is likely to equally consider treaty context and 
objective,101 these elements will nevertheless mean something different here: Since questions 
of TRIPS consistency are embedded in the IIA containing the safeguard clause, an arbitration 
tribunal will primarily rely on context and objective of the BIT or FTA as guiding its 
interpretation of the consistency test.102 The interpretative result thus is likely differ from the 
result achieved in a ‘pure’ WTO setting. These examples show the potential problems 
encountered when host states have to rely on TRIPS consistency tests in order to safeguard 
domestic measures implementing TRIPS flexibilities. 
 
The discussion above indicates that the main problems of litigating international IP rules in 
ISDS actually do not result from an extensive interpretation of substantive standards such as 
MFN, FET or umbrella clauses. PM’s and Lilly’s claims in this regard are unlikely to 
successfully invoke international IP standards. Instead, it is the operation of safeguard clauses 
which explicitly refer to international IP norms that may lead investment tribunals to applying 
                                                          
100 Art.31 (3) c) VCLT. See however the Award in Grand River vs US (para.71) where the tribunal did not 
accept any ‘alteration’ of IIA terms based on ‘normal interpretative processes’ under the VCLT. 
101 See generally August Reinisch, The Interpretation of International Investment Agreements, in M Bungenberg, 
J Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, International Investment Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015), 372- 
377, 383-405; Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, International Investment Agreements and the General Body of 
Rules of Public International Law, in M Bungenberg, J Griebel, S Hobe, A Reinisch, International Investment 
Law – A Handbook (Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2015), 363. On the limits of interpretation and in particular the notion 
of systemic integration under Art.31. (3) c) VCLT, see however Grand River vs US, para.71. 
102 On the routine reliance on object and purpose of an IIA in ISDS see Reinisch, note 110, at 396-401. 
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and interpreting these norms. In light of the scarcity of authoritative decisions on international 
IP law, investment tribunals have little guidance to expect from the existing WTO case-law. 
For lack of a better alternative, their decisions may rather serve as de facto precedence for 
WTO panels. Given that investment tribunals cannot be expected to have comparable expertise 
in WTO law (let alone in specific IP matters), and do not have equivalent support available as 
for example a WTO Panel has in form of the WTO Secretariat, this prospect in itself is rather 
worrying.103 More worrying yet are arguments by Eli Lilly that a breach of an international IP 
norm referenced in a safeguard clause automatically leads to expropriation (discussed below). 
 
The perhaps gravest concern with the effect of safeguard clauses however is not about the 
threats to jurisdictional exclusivity of the WTO dispute settlement system, coherence and 
expertise in international IP law, or a far-fetched reading of these clauses. Flynn points out that 
private enforcement of international IP standards via safeguard clauses is a ‘rupture in the 
fabric of international intellectual property law’ that takes away the de facto checks and 
balances operating under a state-to-state dispute settlement system where various factors 
inform decisions to litigate.104 From a host state perspective, these litigation constraints create 
a degree of safety from frivolous claims and extreme interpretations – which a complaining 
state is likely not to advance in fear that they might come back to haunt it.  
 
In essence, denying right holders as private parties the option to invoke the minimum standards 
and general principles of international IP law functions as important de facto policy space. This 
applies especially to less-powerful states whose GDP might be just a fraction of the annual 
turn-over of multinational companies in key IP industries. The complaints of Philip Morris 
against Uruguay are a case in point. Excluding private litigation over public international law 
standards in IP prevents exactly the kind of arguments Eli Lilly now raises against Canada 
where broad concepts such as ‘utility’ as standard for patentability are turned into rigid rules 
that leave no or little flexibility in domestic implementation. This in turn poses a significant 
challenge to the policy space inherent in the international IP system that allows to tailor national 
IP systems to the domestic socio-economic environment and to adapt to dynamic developments 
in technology and how IP protected subject matter is used in a society.105 The ability for private 
investors to challenge compliance with international IP treaties in ISDS proceedings thereby 
has a significant effect on the political economy of cross-border IP litigation – with potential 
further implications for the policy space in the international IP system. 
 
 
b) Attempts to alleviate concerns 
 
The concerns discussed in the previous section, apparent in the Eli Lilly arbitration, most likely 
led Canada to insist on a more comprehensive safeguard clause in the CETA negotiations with 
the EU. There Canada proposed that protection against expropriation ‘does not apply to a 
                                                          
103 See also Mercurio, note 1, at 914. 
104 Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens Intellectual Property Limitations and Exception, 
March 26, 2015 – online available at http://infojustice.org/archives/34189.  
105 On these implications see further the contribution by K Liddell & M Waibel in this Special Issue. 
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decision by a court, administrative tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property 
authority, limiting or creating an intellectual property right, except where the decision amounts 
to a denial of justice or an abuse of right’.106 The EU rejected this and suggested the following 
alternative: ‘For greater certainty, the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property 
rights to the extent that these measures are consistent with [TRIPS] and the IPR Chapter of 
CETA, do not constitute expropriation. Moreover, a determination that these actions are 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement does not establish that there has been an 
expropriation.’107 
   
Common to these proposals is that both expand the protection for IP-related measures from 
expropriation challenges. That aside, they differ significantly: Canada’s proposal – apparently 
informed by its experience in the Lilly dispute so far – replaces international IP treaties as 
benchmark-test for IP-related measures with a denial of justice and abuse of rights standard. 
The EU retains a test of TRIPS (and CETA) consistency for excluding expropriation 
challenges, but makes it explicit that an inconsistency in itself does not imply expropriation. 
This is phrased as a mere clarification – so that nothing prevents an interpretation of existing 
safeguard clauses (such as Art.1110 (7) NAFTA) to the effect that finding a breach of 
international IP norms as such cannot amount to expropriation. Since the further requirements 
for a finding of expropriation (for example under Art.1110 (1) NAFTA) find no equivalent 
expression in international norms on IP limitations (such as Art.1709 (8) on patent revocations), 
a breach of an international IP norm hardly serves as a substitute for criteria commonly 
considered to determine (indirect) expropriations.108 Lilly’s argument that any inconsistency 
with IP treaty norms under Art.1110 (7) NAFTA automatically leads to expropriation is further 
contradicted by the plain meaning of the safeguard clause which clearly states that protection 
against expropriation ‘does not apply’ to the listed IP limitations (once consistent with NAFTA 
Chapter 17).109 
 
Canada’s proposal on the other hand is a way of comprehensively shutting the door on the 
currently most feasible option for investors to litigate international IP norms in ISDS. In light 
of all the problems such an option brings along, it is something countries should give some 
serious thought. As the discussion in the next Section shows, getting rid of the side-effects of 
IP safeguard clauses does not mean that TRIPS and other international IP norms do not have a 
role to play in guiding our understanding of the often ambiguous standards of investment 
                                                          
106 European Commission, Trade Policy Committee, EU Canada FTA Negotiations: Investment Chapter, Trade 
B2/CBA/cg/Ares 1151153 (C-386), 7 April 2014, at 13 (Art.X.11 - emphasis added). See also the discussion in 
M Schewel, EU, Canada Fail To Close CETA; Stuck Over Issue Related To Eli Lilly Case, Inside U.S. Trade, 
Vol. 32, No. 19, 9 May 2014. 
107 Ibid (emphasis added). 
108 For a comprehensive discussion of the indirect expropriation standard and its application to IP rights see 
Klopschinski, as note 1, at 405-471. For an overview on expropriation in international (investment) law see 
Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, (April 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=703244, and August Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, edited by Peter Muchlinski, Fredrico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 407. 
109 See Eli Lilly vs Canada, Claimant’s Reply Memorial, 11 September 2015, para.255-258.  For a further 
discussion see also Gibson, note 95, at 461-463. 
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protection when applied to IP rights. Instead, the proposal ensures that these clauses cannot be 
abused to litigate the host state’s compliance with international IP norms in a forum that is 
certainly not the optimal one to address these issues. Most importantly, it retains the de facto 
policy space that follows from strictly limiting challenges of compliance with international IP 
norms to state-to-state dispute settlement. 
 
At the time of writing however, the EU proposal seems to have won the day in CETA. Canada 
nevertheless managed to include a separate ‘Declaration to Investment Chapter Article X.11 
Paragraph 6’ which states: 
‘Mindful that investor state dispute settlement tribunals (…) are not an appeal 
mechanism for the decisions of domestic courts, the Parties recall that the domestic 
courts of each Party are responsible for the determination of the existence and validity 
of intellectual property rights.’  
This language primarily aims to ensure that host state sovereignty over the grant, denial and 
revocation of IP rights is not affected by ISDS tribunals second-guessing the proper application 
of domestic IP law. It however does not affect the TRIPS consistency test under the safeguard 
clause proposed by the EU. It also would not prevent ISDS challenges of national court 
decisions on the validity or existence of an IP right granted under national law: while an ISDS 
tribunal of course cannot bring back to life a patent that a Canadian Court found to be invalid, 
the declaration does not prevent the tribunal to award damages should such an invalidation be 
construed as expropriation or breach of the FET standard. In case of an expropriation challenge, 
a tribunal would again be invited to assess the consistency of such a court decision against 
international IP norms – with all the negative consequences discussed in section a) above. 
 
Finally, India has proposed yet another alternative version of the safeguard clauses. In its draft 
Model Investment Treaty,110 under Art.2 (Scope and General Provisions), it suggests that  
‘[t]his Treaty shall not apply to’ (…) the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in 
relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of 
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or 
creation is consistent with the Law of the Host State.’111 
While this appears as a well-intended attempt to leave decisions on all kinds of IP matters to 
the domestic law, it may create an even graver problem: A plain reading of this clause would 
invite investors to simply claim a breach of domestic law in order to overcome this hurdle. This 
in turn would make any ISDS tribunal established under an IIA containing such a clause the 
final appeals instance for the consistency of national court and other decisions with their own 
domestic law: a true super-constitutional court without any democratic legitimacy. In IP 
matters, such a clause invites tribunals to review the ‘proper’ application of domestic law by 
                                                          
110 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, online available at 
https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model20%Text20%for20%the20%Indian20%Bilateral20%Inv
estment20%Treaty[1].pdf   
111 See Art.2.6 (v) of Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (emphasis added). 
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IP offices and the courts and essentially gives ISDS tribunals the last say in construing, inter 
alia, domestic patent, trademark and copyright law.112 
 
The attempts to address the law and policy implications caused by safeguard clauses show that 
states are waking up to the problems discussed  in this section and look for alternatives. Since 
the core of the problem is created by providing private investors a route to challenge 
compliance with public international standards of IP protection, the principal solution lies in 
shutting this avenue down. That in turn does not necessarily negate an appropriate role for 
international IP norms in informing the proper construction of IIA standards in IP-related 
investment disputes. It would also not prevent states from relying on other means to achieve 
the ‘safeguarding’ effect of clauses like Art.1110 (7) NAFTA or Art.6 (5) of the US Model 
BIT. The final Section of this Article considers how general international law tools to integrate 
rules from one of its subsystems into another one can serve as alternatives to safeguard clauses. 
 
 
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS TOOLS 
OF INTEGRATION 
 
How could an alternative model for addressing the interface between international IP and 
investment law look like? This Section concludes the review of various routes for litigating 
international IP norms in ISDS by offering a framework based on general international law as 
an alternative that does not involve the negative ‘side effects’ of safeguard clauses discussed 
in the previous Section. Before however, a summary on these routes allows to recapitulate the 
main findings and to better contrast them to the operation of the proposed general international 
tools. 
 
In light of emerging disputes over IP rights as protected investments, this Article has reviewed 
the options for right holders to challenge compliance with international IP norms in ISDS. Most 
of these options are based on an expansive reading of traditional elements of the investment 
protection regime such as legitimate expectations under FET and expropriation standards, 
umbrella clauses or MFN. In my opinion, none of these attempts is likely to be successful. 
While generalisations are difficult in light of the primarily bilateral or regional nature of 
investment treaty protection that provides for ISDS, analysing the tobacco packaging cases and 
the patent revocation dispute reveals high hurdles for investors:   
(1) Leaving jurisdictional issues about the exclusive competence of the WTO dispute 
settlement system to rule over breaches of TRIPS aside, an investor can only rely on an 
international IP rule if it is 
a) directly applicable as part of the domestic law;  
b) sufficiently concrete to be applied by domestic institutions; and  
                                                          
112 One however has to note that for complaints of expropriation, an ISDS tribunal (as under Art.14 or 15 of the 
draft) ‘shall not have authority to review the Host State’s determination of whether a Measure was taken for a 
public purpose or in compliance with its Law.’ While this may in the end prevent ISDS tribunals to review 
domestic IP law in case of expropriation complaints, this would not cover complaints about breaches of any of 
the other standards of treatment in Art.3, 4 and 6 of the draft Model BIT. 
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c) gives rise to individual rights of the investor.113 
The expectation to comply with such a rule is further subject to policy space in its 
implementation and has to be balanced against the host state’s right to regulate.  
(2) Umbrella clauses – even if not limited to specific commitments made by host states – 
have so far not been held as extending to obligations the host state has entered into vis-
à-vis other states in international law. Neither the intention of the IIA state parties, nor 
the underlying pacta sunt servanda rationale for umbrella clauses supports an 
application which would allow right holders to rely on such clauses to claim a breach 
of international IP treaties in ISDS. 
(3) Finally, also MFN rules in IIAs cannot be applied to incorporate IP protection under 
TRIPS or other international IP treaties as a form of ‘more favourable treatment’ to 
foreign investors. Based on the ejusdem generis principle, the differences in subject 
matter and standards of protection between IP and investment law stand against the 
inclusion of specific international IP protections via an IIA MFN rule. 
 
It is then somewhat ironic that the most promising route for right holders to invoke breaches 
of international IP norms in investment disputes is based on clauses which should safeguard 
flexibilities in the international IP system from abusive reliance on the notion of expropriation. 
As Lilly’s complaint about Canada’s breaches of NAFTA, TRIPS and the PCT shows, the 
consequence of clauses like Art.1110:7 NAFTA is that consistency with international IP norms 
is tested in ISDS. In the context of TRIPS, this raises questions about the legitimacy and 
acceptance of any decisions on TRIPS compliance rendered by investment arbitration tribunals 
in light of the competing jurisdiction under the WTO dispute settlement system: If a similar 
safeguard clause existed under the HK-AUS BIT, should the plain packaging arbitrators have 
deferred a decision on Australia’s compliance with Art.20 TRIPS to findings made by the WTO 
Panel? Should they rather wait until the Appellate Body has had its final say on the matter, or 
could they even refrain from judging on TRIPS consistency? What if on the other hand 
arbitrators in the patent revocation case make findings about a breach (or not) of NAFTA’s IP 
Chapter, in particular its ambiguous standard of patent ‘utility’? Could that have implications 
for construing the essentially identically worded TRIPS patentability standards? Would such a 
finding affect any future WTO or NAFTA dispute brought by, for example, the US against 
Canada?  
 
The analysis above has shown that the institutional and normative framework within which a 
dispute is decided does matter: Next to questions of subject matter expertise and secretarial 
support, differences in allocating the burden of proof and determining the appropriate 
‘normative environment’ for interpreting and applying IP provisions are likely to lead to 
distinct outcomes. In particular where the IP treaty (such as the PCT)114 does not have its own 
specific dispute settlement system, investment decisions on IP matters enjoy a de facto 
                                                          
113 See also Klopschinski, note 1, at 368-379, 387-389. Weiler, note 9, reaches the same conclusion in relation to 
PM’s claims based on legitimate expectations derived from TRIPS in its dispute against Uruguay.  
114 Under Art.59 of the PCT, states can bring a dispute over compliance with the PCT to the ICJ, subject to the 
rules of the ICJ Statute (in particular state-consent). 
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precedence-setting character. Should it really be a matter of who gets to decide first or even 
who gets to decide at all? 
 
A yet more interesting question is what the alternatives to the conventional safeguard clauses 
are. A first step appears to be clarifications along the lines of the EU sponsored rule in CETA 
which ensures that inconsistency with TRIPS is not sufficient to establish expropriation. One 
could go further and substitute – as proposed by Canada – the TRIPS consistency test with one 
that focuses on traditional investment standards, such as denial of justice or an abuse of right. 
The latter would avoid the problems linked to competing decisions on the same set of 
international rules. At the same time, it would not prevent investment arbitrators to have regard 
to international IP rules based on applicable law rules in IIAs, the lex arbitri or on general 
international law doctrines. As Gibson notes, several IIAs make more general reference to 
‘international law’ or ‘applicable rules of international law’; while Art.42 of the ICSID 
Convention provides that unless the parties agreed on the applicable law, the tribunal will apply 
the law of the host state ‘and such rules of international law as may be applicable.’115  
 
These considerations point to the readily available alternatives based on general international 
law that I would propose as a less-disrupting framework for addressing the interface between 
international investment and IP law: Treaty interpretation and the concept of systemic 
integration offer sufficient means to achieve the aim of safeguard clauses to protect the host 
state against abusive expropriation claims in the IP context. TRIPS and other international IP 
norms usually serve as relevant interpretive context, in particular under Art.31 (3) c) VCLT: 
As soon as both state parties to the IIA are members of the WTO, the Paris or Berne Union, 
provisions of those treaties that more specifically bear upon a host state measure affecting IP 
rights as protected investments may be considered as ‘relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’.116 As a form of lex specialis for the protection 
of IPR related investments, international IP norms hence may affect the interpretation of 
investment standards. This can take place in particular in two situations:  
(1) when determining the appropriate scope of protection based on open and ambiguous 
investment standards as applied to IP assets: The notion of full protection and security 
(FPS) for example, when applied in the context of measures taken by the host state 
pertaining to the enforcement of IP rights, should be understood in light of the 
provisions on IP enforcement in Part III of TRIPS. Here, the due diligence duty of a 
host state to protect an investor’s IP rights against infringements that is owed under 
FPS should not be understood to exceed the specific IP enforcement standards 
applicable in relation between the IIA parties: Since the duty to protect under FPS does 
not involve absolute liability but a reasonable degree of care,117 the latter finds a more 
concrete expression in the relevant IP enforcement rules.118 
                                                          
115 See Gibson, note 95, at 442. 
116 See Verhoosel, note 47, at 503-506. Canada also takes this view in its Rejoinder Memorial of 8 December 
2015, at para.179-180. 
117 See the discussion of several tribunal decisions to this effect by Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and 
Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol.1 No.2 (2010), 353-369, at 366-376. 
118 For a detailed discussion on the full protection and security standard and IP rights see Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law (OUP, forthcoming 2016). 
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(2) Art.31 (3) c) VCLT can also be applied to uphold recognized flexibilities and 
exceptions in the international IP system and import them into international investment 
law: When dealing with compulsory licenses or other exceptions or limitations to IP 
rights, the notion of expropriation should be ‘systemically integrated’119 into the more 
specific international IP rules and hence be generally understood as not overriding 
existing flexibilities in the IP system. This serves exactly the same function as the 
explicit safeguard clauses discussed above – without however leading to the application 
of the relevant international IP norms in such a way that their breach can be reviewed 
in ISDS. Here these norms merely form the interpretative frame and in that way guide 
towards an understanding of investment standards that is in line with the more specific 
rules of the international IP system, including its flexibilities. 
General international law doctrines hence are readily available to fulfil the tasks of specific 
safeguard clauses – without the discussed side effects that follow from allowing investors to 
challenge compliance with international IP treaties in ISDS. The notion of systemic integration 
of course also allows investors to claim that investment standards are to be understood in light 
of IP norms which the investor may allege to have been breached by the host state. For example, 
Eli Lilly could claim that the revocation of its patents by Canadian Courts amounts to an 
expropriation under NAFTA Ch.11 because the latter has to be understood in light of both 
TRIPS and the NAFTA Ch.17 rules on patent revocation and utility as a condition for 
patentability. Arbitrators examining this claim would arguably also form their view on what 
these international IP standards entail and whether Canada’s court decisions are consistent with 
them. That however does not mean that arbitrators are directly applying these standards and 
judging on Canada’s compliance. Under interpretative concepts such as systemic integration, 
consistency with international IP norms merely feeds into the principal analysis of the 
expropriation standard – as one of several factors.120 
The main downside of relying on general international law doctrines is the legal uncertainty 
that comes along with it: arbitrators may not consider IP norms as ‘relevant rules’ under Art.31 
(3) c) VCLT, they may select other ones than those commonly referred to in safeguard clauses 
or may find their influence on the appropriate understanding of the investment standard not 
decisive, perhaps in light of other elements of treaty interpretation. It is not too hard to assess, 
in general terms, whether these shortcomings weigh as heavy as the negative effects of relying 
on traditional safeguard clauses described above. As the latter effectively allow private 
enforcement of international IP norms, most states may find this perspective rather worrying. 
Those who draft the next generation of IIAs therefore should think carefully which approach 
they prefer in addressing the overlap between international IP and investment rules.  
To the extent however that safeguard clauses continue to apply, one way of mitigating the 
negative effects discussed above would be to rely on conflicts-of-law principles in addressing 
                                                          
119 C Mclachlan (2005), ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 54 No. 2, 279-320. 
120 Next to other interpretative elements such as ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose, BITs 
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expropriation; see for example Annex A to the 2013 US Model BIT or Art.1110:8 NAFTA. 
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overlaps between different systems in international law: As I have argued elsewhere,121 an 
investment tribunal charged with judging on the TRIPS consistency may – mindful that it is 
applying a form of ‘foreign law’ – refer to notions in private international law in pleading and 
proving the existence and substance of a relevant international IP rule.  The tribunal should 
then treat this as a matter of fact (rather than law) that needs to be proven by appropriate 
evidence. It thus should hear external experts testifying what these foreign rules mean – instead 
of construing them from their own perspective.  
Alternatively, an investment tribunal may consider staying its proceedings and – especially in 
case of parallel proceedings such as in the plain packaging disputes – awaiting a final decision 
from the WTO dispute settlement body. Finally, the tribunal could operate a system of de facto 
deference to the implementation of international IP norms in the national law of the host state: 
Especially for broad and open terms such as utility, inventiveness, or justifiability, any 
implementation that is supported by ordinary meaning and context of these terms should suffice 
for a finding of consistency under a safeguard clause. Accepting a significant amount of 
discretion on the side of the host state in implementing international IP norms would further 
align with the policy space TRIPS offers to give effect to public interests and to balance the 
interests of right holders and users.122 Such deferential approaches to dealing with international 
IP norms should not be misunderstood as blanket scepticism about the ability of investment 
tribunals to apply and interpret international IP law. It is rather a call for taking the views and 
voices of those primarily dealing with distinct subject matter – such as IP – into account. 
                                                          
121 See Henning Grosse Ruse – Khan, A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to Competing Rationalities in International 
Law: The Case of Plain Packaging between IP, Trade, Investment and Health, Journal of Private International 
Law, Vol.9 No.2 (2013), 309-348. 
122 See para.4 of the Doha Declaration, note 5, where all WTO Members agree that TRIPS ‘does not and should 
not’ prevent WTO Members from giving effect to public health. See further Art.7 TRIPS whereby such a 
balance is one of the principal objectives for IP protection and enforcement under TRIPS. 
